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ABSTRACT
Moral responsibility is an issue at the heart of the free-will debate. The question of how we can
have moral responsibility in a deterministic world is an interesting and puzzling one. Compatibilists
arguments have left open the possibility that the ability to do otherwise is not required for moral
responsibility. The challenge, then, is to come up with what our attributions of moral responsibility are
tracking. To do this, criteria which can adequately differentiate cases in which the agent is responsible
from cases in which the agent is not responsible are required. I argue that an agent is responsible for the
consequences of an action if they stem, in an appropriate way, from the agent's deep values and desires.
These deep values and desires make up the Deep Self. Parts of the Deep Self, first, tend to be enduring;
second, desires within it tend to be general (as opposed to directed towards specific things); third, they
tend to be reflectively endorsed by the agent; fourth, these traits are often central to the agent's self-
conception; and fifth, they are not generally in extr me conflict with other deep traits. Empirical work
is drawn upon to help develop a suitable account of what deserves to be called a part of the Deep Self. I
also strengthen and extend this view by considering issues of poor judgement and weakness of will,
and when and how we can be considered responsible for them.
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Free-will is a question which many philosophers andl y-people alike have spent much time
pondering over. This is for good reason. Free will is a deep issue which is relevant to our everyday
experiences, our views of how the universe works, and our notions of responsibility. Views of free will
have the potential to challenge our views on legal as well as moral matters.
Much of the debate over free-will is on the issue of m ral responsibility. It is largely due to the
repercussions views of free-will can have on our views of responsibility that the free-will issue holds
such great importance. If the behaviour of agents is deterministic, this seems – to many people – to
undermine the idea that they can be held responsible in a deep way. Libertarians1 hold that, although in
a deterministic universe we cannot hold people ultima ely responsible for their actions, agents are not
wholly deterministic and therefore they can be held ultimately responsible for at least some of their
actions. Hard determinists2 also accept that determinism and moral responsibility (as it is currently
understood) are incompatible, and conclude that, since the universe is deterministic, ultimate
responsibility does not exist.
Others reject the idea that determinism is incompatible with the freedoms required for any
coherent sort of responsibility. Compatibilists3 view determinism as compatible with, if not required
for, moral responsibility. This captures the attractive features of both hard determinism and
libertarianism. It accepts the libertarian view that responsibility is not an illusion or a mistake, and it
also acknowledges, as hard determinists do, that we re part of the physical world, working under the
deterministic laws of nature. However, this raises many questions. How can we differentiate the actions
of a person from that of a falling rock? Both are simply following the laws of physics. How, then, can
one be held responsible if it injures another human bei g, but the other cannot? Since both are obeying
1 e.g.  Kane, 1998
2 e.g. Weatherford, 1991
3 e.g. Fischer & Ravizza, 1998
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the laws of physics, neither the person nor the rock can behave differently. This realization brings forth
a powerful intuition in many people – that if it is the case that people cannot act differently, it is not
right to hold them responsible for their actions.
The intuition that agents must have alternate possibilities open to them in order to be held
responsible, in its most naive form, has been powerfully refuted. Harry Frankfurt4 has argued
persuasively that there exist counterexamples which show that alternate possibilities are not required
for responsibility. Although this has far from closed the debate over alternate possibilities and
responsibility, it does raise the interesting possibility that our intuitions about responsibility are t acking
something other than whether agents have alternate possibilities open to them. The compatibilist's job,
then, is to find an account of responsibility which satisfies these intuitions in a coherent way. 
There are many views of what is required for responibility within the compatibilist camp. The
current project is to review some of these views, using them to develop and defend my own view. This
view posits that praise and blame are social attitudes5, which have identifiable norms governing when
they are applicable. I argue that in order for an agent to be held morally responsible for an action, the
agent must meet two criteria. First, the agent must be able to properly understand and react to reasons
for action. Second, the desire to act in a particular way must stem from the acting agent's self in the
appropriate way.
Being able to recognize and react to reasons is called reasons-responsiveness. To be more
explicit about what this means, an agent is said to be (at least weakly) reasons-responsive if there is
some possible world where the facts relevant to a decision have changed, but the agent has not, and this
results in a different choice by the agent. This idea seems to capture some of our intuitions about wha
sorts of agents have moral responsibility, and has been defended as the defining feature of morally
4 Frankfurt, 1969
5 As argued by Strawson in P.F. Strawson, 1962
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responsible agents by Fischer and Ravizza.6 It is certainly the case that agents without any sort of
reasons-responsiveness do not seem to be proper candidates for moral responsibility. An agent who acts
the same way regardless of the facts relevant to the decision is much more like a rock than like a
morally responsible agent. This, then, gives us a way of differentiating morally responsible agents from
inert matter – although they both are simply following the laws of physics, only responsible agents are
reasons-responsive. However, this leads to an interesting question – there seem to be many cases in
which a reasons-responsive agent acts, but is being compelled to act in a particular way despite what
they really want. 
There are many different addictions and pathologies (such as Obsessive Compulsive Disorder)
which cause agents to perform actions which, in many c ses, we do not want to hold them responsible
for. Even if these agents are reasons-responsive, and acting based on the desires which they have, they
may not be responsible for some of their actions. There are numerous views on why this is the case.
Generally, though, they all claim that the relevant f c or in these cases is that the agents' actions d  not
stem from, or are not endorsed by, their selves in a relevant way.
The view I endorse about what actions an agent is responsible for is a combination of the Whole
Self view of Arpaly and Schroeder,7 and the Deep Self view outlined by Sripada.8 On this view, an
agent is responsible if their actions stem from values or desires which are a part of their Deep Self,or
(synonymously) are well-integrated. Parts of the Dep Self tend to be enduring, desires within it tend to
be general (as opposed to directed towards specific things), they tend to be reflectively endorsed by the
agent, these traits are often central to the agent's self-conception, and are not generally in extreme
conflict with other deep traits. Although these criteria may not be rigorous, they may be the best that
can be done – these are, after all, criteria which we (by hypothesis) track and make social judgements
6 Fischer & Ravizza, 1998
7 Arpaly & Schroeder, 1999
8 Sripada, 2010
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about. Thus it should not be surprising that they ar  a little fuzzy around the edges – social life is
complex. There are many cases in which our intuitions about the responsibility of the agent are
ambiguous and fuzzy – if the fuzziness of our intuitions matches up with the fuzziness in this account,
then the lack of a crystal clear delineation is a virtue of the account.
This project thus seeks to scope out the territory of moral responsibility, and offer a critique of
many of the current views on the issue. It will then put forward a particular view, drawing upon the
insights of many of the other accounts on the issue. I will draw on empirical work in an attempt to
provide some additional grounding to this view. It will also address some possible difficulties, and
attempt to clarify some of the concepts at work in the background of this (and many other) views of
responsibility.
The present project is broken into three chapters. The first chapter acts to further introduce the
issues involved with moral responsibility, briefly mention some of the history behind the issue, and
give a more in-depth analysis and critique of the various views on the issue. It explains the concept of
reasons-responsiveness, how this helps to define morally responsible agents, and points out some of the
limitations of this view – specifically, that it does not give an adequate way to differentiate motives for
action that the agent is responsible for from those that the agent is not. I then look at several views
which could fill this gap, offering a critique of many of these views, while defending Arpaly's Whole
Self view. It closes with some residual questions which the Whole Self view leaves us with, most
importantly, how to define what parts of agents we can view as a part of their Whole Selves.
The second chapter picks up the questions which the first chapter left us with. The Deep Self
view is introduced and compared to the Whole Self vi w, in order to combine and strengthen both.
Both of these views posit that some traits of our selves are in some way more representative of who we
truly are, and it is only for actions stemming from these deep traits that we can be held responsible for.
By comparing, critiquing, and combining these views, I am able to give additional clarity to the issue of
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what constitutes a deep part of the self. The chapter then goes on to explicitly point out situations i
which agents are not responsible for their actions – in particular, when their actions stem from faulty
cognitive mechanisms instead of from their Deep Selves.
The final chapter discusses explicitly some of the concepts relevant to assessments of action
which are often left implicitly assumed, and discuss some of the interesting issues that these concepts
raise. Specifically, I discuss the scientific literature on self-control and judgement in an attempt to
better understand these concepts, and raise the inter sting questions of whether we can be held
responsible for a lack of either. I argue that in some cases, we do hold people responsible for a lack of




A large part of the free-will debate is over the question of moral responsibility. Is moral
responsibility possible in a deterministic world? What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for an
agent to be morally responsible for a particular action? Both of these questions have received wide
attention in the philosophical literature. A number of different positions have sprung up out of this
debate, giving a wide range of possible answers to these questions. In this chapter, I will briefly explain
some of the positions, before going into more detail on one particular view – the reasons-responsive
view.
Libertarians9 hold that free will and ultimate responsibility are incompatible with determinism.
In their view, one of the requirements for responsibility is the ability to do otherwise in a metaphysical
sense. Since, under determinism, there is only one p ssible course of action an agent may take,
libertarians see ultimate responsibility as requiring some amount of indeterminism. Compatibilists,
however, disagree – they do not believe that a significa t aspect of responsibility requires
indeterminism. Compatibilists instead look for other r quirements for responsibility. 
There are numerous compatibilist views which claim d fferent requirements must be met in
order for an agent to be responsible. One such viewis the reasons-responsive view. The reasons-
responsive view holds that an agent is morally respon ible if that agent is responsive to reasons.10 That
is, if there is some possible world where the facts have changed, but the agent has not, and this results
in a different choice by the agent, we can say that this agent is (at least weakly) reasons-responsive.
This is a powerful idea, and seems to capture some of our intuitions about what sorts of agents have
moral responsibility. However, as outlined, the view is incomplete – what is required is a manner of
9 e.g. Kane, 1998
10 Fischer & Ravizza, 1998
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saying when an agent is responsible for an action, as opposed to something else which happens to be
controlling their body.
There are many cases of pathologies (such as Obsessive Compulsive Disorder) and addictions
which cause actions which – though the agent may be acting in a way which would be responsive to
certain reasons – we feel that the agent should not be held fully responsible for. One way to account for
these sorts of cases is to give an outline of what is required for us to say that an action stems from the
agent in a relevant sort of way. In an important sese, addictions and pathologies are often not
integrated into a person's psychology, and are a sort of foreign object, forcing the agent to act in one
particular way or another against his/her will. The Whole Self view will be presented as a way of
separating well-integrated desires from those that are not well-integrated, and thus gives us a way of
differentiating those who act on a desire and should be held responsible for it, and those who act on a
desire and should not.
A Review of Free Will and Responsibility
Free will is possibly the philosophical question which has generated the most debate.11 The
importance of the debate is quite apparent: our notio s of freedom are tied closely to our notions of
responsibility. We tend to think it inappropriate to hold people responsible for things they have no
control over. It is therefore of importance to ask: “Do we have control over our actions?” The worry is
that, in a deterministic universe, the answer to this question may be a simple “No.” If all of our actions
are determined by the physical make-up of the universe and the laws of physics, there does not seem to
be much sense to the claim that we are free to do otherwise – there is only ever one course of action
available to us.
Determinism is a central worry within the free-will debate. There are those (the libertarians)
who argue that free-will and moral responsibility require some amount of indeterminism, and argue for
11 Matson 1987,  A New History of Philosophy. Vol. 1. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich. quoted in Kane, 1998
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a certain level of indeterminism.12 Libertarians tend to focus on the role that indeterminism may play,
and how this may allow for agents to have the ability to do otherwise. Hard-determinists agree with the
libertarians that free-will and moral responsibility require indeterminism, but argue that, in fact,
determinism holds and thus we do not have free-will and cannot legitimately hold people morally
responsible.
A intuition which plays a large role in motivating this discussion is the principle of alternate
possibilities. This principle states that in order to be morally responsible for an action, the agent in
question must have been able to do otherwise. Since, i  a deterministic universe, agents are not able to
do otherwise, agents in such a universe cannot be morally responsible. However, this principle has been
called into question. Harry Frankfurt gives the following counterexample:13 imagine that Jones is
deciding whether or not to pursue a particular course of action. Unknown to Jones, Black wants Jones
to perform a specific action. Black is observing as Jones is deciding whether to perform the action or
not, and, if he suspects Jones is going to do otherwis , will then act, manipulating Jones' brain in such a
way to cause Jones to perform the action regardless. In other words, though he does not know it, Jones
is unable to do otherwise. Yet, if Jones decides to perform the action without Black intervening, it is
clear that Jones is morally responsible for this action. The fact that Black would have stepped in and
changed things if Jones decision came out otherwise does not change Jones' responsibility in the matter.
There has been a long debate about what exactly these sorts of counterexamples mean for the
principle of alternate possibilities.14 Regardless, the argument does strongly suggest that what is of
central importance to moral responsibility is the source of the action, and it is not clear whether this
source must be indeterministic for moral responsibility to hold. Libertarians and hard-determinists,
since they agree that determinism is incompatible with moral responsibility, share a position called
(fittingly enough) incompatibilism. The opposing camp, compatibilism, holds that, in fact, determinism
12 Kane, 1998
13 Frankfurt, 1969
14 For a review of this literature, see Levy & McKenna, 2009
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and moral responsibility can co-exist. On this view, it does not matter whether we have the ability to do
otherwise in a metaphysical sense, but the source of our actions must be of a particular sort for us to be
morally responsible. That is, even in a completely determined universe, we could still have legitimate
reason to hold agents morally responsible, as long as the action-causing mechanisms within those
agents fit certain criteria. The compatibilists arein the business of trying to develop what those crit ria
are, and argue for how they might work to give riseto moral responsibility. They are generally of the
opinion that all intelligible forms of freedom can be had, even if in some metaphysical sense all of our
actions are predetermined.
The compatibilist project is to show how the resources available in a deterministic setting are
sufficient to grant some freedoms which are sufficient for responsibility. Incompatibilists can recognize
and appreciate some types of compatibilist freedoms, even if they disagree with compatibilists that
these freedoms exhaust the freedoms we want and are sufficient to grant us responsibility. As Robert
Kane says: 
[E]ven if we lived in a determined world, we could meaningfully distinguish persons who are
free from such things as physical restraint, addiction or neurosis, coersion or political
oppression, from persons not free from these things, and we could allow that these freedoms
would be worth preferring to their opposites even in a determined world.15
Kane, a libertarian (and therefore an incompatibilist), is of the opinion that compatibilist accounts of
freedom are important, and have been meaningful contributions to philosophy. His opinions differ from
compatibilists in that he contends that the compatibilist freedoms do not give us all of the freedoms and
responsibility we want, and that indeterminism can add something further.
For the purposes of the present project, I wish to remain neutral on the topic of indeterminist
free-will. It seems it is perfectly possible to do w rk on a compatibilist project in such a way that does
not preclude the existence or significance of indeterminism. I will not comment further on
incompatibilist free-will here – it is not the topic I wish to pursue, and it suffices for me to state hat the
15  Kane, 1998, p 15
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sorts of compatibilist notions of moral responsibility I will be discussing are consistent with
determinism or indeterminism, and do not presuppose the presence or absence of indeterminist free-
will.
Types of Compatibilism
David Hume is credited with articulating the most influential compatibilist position.16 According
to Hume,17 an action is free if it is caused by the acting agent's willing. That is, if an agent, based on
their desires, wills to perform an action, and in so doing performs the action, the agent acted freely. In
this way, an involuntary twitch is different from a voluntary movement – the former was not willed and
just happened automatically, while the latter was willed and caused by the agent's wanting to do so.
According to Hume, what matters is not that we have, in a metaphysical sense, other possibilities open
to us – it is that we are free to perform the actions we want to perform. Thus, when we act on a desire,
we are responsible for that action. When we act because we were forced in some way, we are not
responsible – our action does not stem from a desire to act in a particular way, but from an external
force acting on us.
While Hume's view is extremely important, it is important to note that it seems to have
counterexamples. Take, for example, unwilling addicts. They may have tried their best to quite the
object of their addiction numerous times, and failed. Yet, they have a strong desire to use the substance,
and in a sense willingly do so. Similarly, people suffering from Obsessive Compulsive Disorder have
strong desires to perform their compulsions. Yet in these cases, it does not seem right to hold the agents
responsible for these actions. In an important sense, it eems they are not free. Though they might, in a
sense, be acting on what they want, it is clear that they are being forced. Desires can arise in and cuse
actions in a way which undermines responsibility.




what we want, but we must have a second-order desire for that want. That is, we have to desire to have
the particular desire we are acting on. This line of thinking has been taken up by Harry Frankfurt,
according to whom it is when we are able to want what we want to want that we are free.18 In other
words, when our higher order desires line up in the appropriate way with our lower order desires, we
are free. You are morally responsible for an action if you did not have a higher-order desire to do
otherwise. Unwilling addicts have desires for the substance to which they are addicted, but also do not
want to have that desire. That is, unwilling addicts would, if they could, eliminate their want of the
addicting substance (in contrast to willing addicts, who would not). Unwilling addicts thus have a first-
order desire to take a substance, but a higher-orde desire to abstain from it.
One could question why Frankfurt feels higher-order sires are so important for moral
responsibility. If one has a first-order desire for a particular action, and a second-order desire to do
otherwise, why hold the agent responsible for the second-order but not the first? The answer Frankfurt
gives to this is that agents must identify with their first-order desires in order to be responsible for
them. To identify with a first-order desire is to judge that any further questioning of that desire would
lead to the same conclusion. In this sense, higher-order desires can be seen as double-checks on the
initial answer, to see if the agent truly wants the target of the first-order desire. If these double-ch cks
produce the same result, the agent is likely to decide that any further checking will also produce the
same result, and thus the desire is one the agent truly wants.19 This form of identification will be
discussed again briefly below.
Peter Strawson has taken a different view on what is required for responsibility. He has argued
that what grounds moral responsibility is our reactive attitudes.20 The reactive attitudes are the attitudes
and opinions we hold towards others in response to their actions. They are “natural human reactions to
the good or ill will or indifference of others towards us, as displayed in their attitudes and actions.
18 Frankfurt, 1971
19 Frankfurt, 1987
20 P.F. Strawson, 1962
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[emphasis in original]”21 As Watson points out, on this view, it is not that we hold people responsible
because they are responsible, but that “the idea (our idea) that we are responsible is to be understood by
the practice, which itself is not a matter of holding some propositions to be true, but of expressing our
concerned and demands about our treatment of one another. [emphasis in original]”22 In Strawson's
view, the reactive attitudes are not things to be explained in terms of how we come to be responsible,
but an inescapable, arational part of what it means to be human and to have social relationships.
On Strawson's account, we have reactive attitudes towards people when they are the proper
beneficiaries of such attitudes. We do not hold certain people responsible (e.g. children or those with
deep-rooted psychological abnormality) insofar as we see them as excluded from ordinary adult human
relationships which spawn the reactive attitudes. As Galen Strawson points out, though, our intuitions
about who is a deserving subject of the reactive attitudes can change if we (for example) view their
actions as having come about by way of deterministic processes.23 That is, the incompatibilist's worry
seems to still live on in what sorts of explanations f actions can temper our reactive attitudes. It i  not
enough simply to state that those who we hold reactive attitudes towards are responsible. The Strawson
account is, at best, incomplete, and we need a fleshed out theory of what our intuitions are tracking
when we see someone as being either morally responsible or not morally responsible for a particular
action. Many compatibilist theories, including the Frankfurt account outlined above, can be seen as
attempts to achieve this fleshing out.
As the Frankfurt examples make clear, it is not simply being able to do otherwise which matters
for moral responsibility. Yet, there seems to be some powerful intuition that something like the ability
to do otherwise is important for being able to do otherwise. One possibility that has been explored is
that it is the ability to do otherwise if the reasons for acting have changed that leads to moral
responsibility. This position is called reasons-responsiveness. Reason responsiveness is perhaps the
21 P.F. Strawson, 1962, p 53
22 Watson, 1987, p 121
23 G. Strawson, 1986
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most common framework compatibilists work within. According to philosophers in the reason
responsiveness camp, it is the ability for us to recognize and act for reasons which lays the foundation
necessary for responsibility. This camp holds that as long as agents' actions stem from their own
reasons-responsive mechanism, it does not matter whther these reasons-responsive mechanisms, the
agents, or the world, are deterministic. What matters is that if the reasons were to change in a specific
way, the actions of the agent in question would change. This has the advantage of requiring a specific
sort of processing for moral responsibility, while still requiring agents to be able to “do otherwise”,
with the caveat that they be doing otherwise due to r asons being otherwise. With this in place, we can
speak of the sorts of reasons for which an agent has acted, and whether these were morally
praiseworthy or blameworthy. The view I wish to pursue lies in this camp, and thus this will be
discussed in more detail below.
Moderate Reasons-Responsiveness
The view which will be developed here will be in the reasons-responsiveness camp. The
remainder of this chapter will be fleshing out what seems to be, at least, a plausible account of some of
the ingredients required to hold an agent morally responsible. This will provide the framework with
which to work out the details of the mechanisms required for one to be a moral agent. I begin with the
view of Fischer and Ravizza, who contend that what is necessary for moral responsibility is moderate
reasons-responsiveness.24 This amounts to three requirements. First, the agent in question must be
strongly receptive to reasons. Secondly, the agent mus be weakly reactive to reasons. Finally, and most
simply, one must be able to act based on their choices.
Being receptive to reasons simply means being able to s e and judge reasons for what they are.
Being weakly receptive to reasons means that there is at least some imaginable set of circumstances
which the agent could recognize as being reason to act in a particular way. That is, the agent is capable
24 Fischer & Ravizza, 1998
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of recognizing at least one possible scenario as being r ason to take a particular action. This, Fischer
and Ravizza argue, is not sufficient for moral responsibility.25 The issue is that one can be receptive to
reasons in an irrational or unpatterned way. If youfind that tickets for a basketball game being $100 is
sufficient reason to not buy a ticket, you should recognize tickets being $200 to be sufficient reason to
not buy a ticket. Failure to do so impinges on your credibility as a moral agent – it seems that some
base-line of objectivity in judging reasons is required for one to be morally responsible. Thus, Fischer
and Ravizza suggest that what is required is strong easons receptivity – your hierarchical ordering of
reasons must be understandably patterned in an objective way. Thus, a third-party who asks you what
actions you would take in particular circumstances would be able to understand the pattern by which
you judge reasons.
The second requirement for being moderately reason-responsive is that the agent must be at
least weakly reason reactive. While reasons-receptivity deals with the recognition of reasons, reasons-
reactivity is the ability to choose a course of action based on reasons. Being weakly reasons reactive
means that there is some set of reasons which you would find sufficient to do otherwise. Thus, without
changing anything about the agent, there must be som  set of circumstances which would cause the
agent to choose to do otherwise. The reason that one only needs to be weakly reason responsive,
according to Fischer and Ravizza, is that "if an agent's mechanism reacts to some incentive to (say) do
other than he actually does, this shows that the mechanism can react to any incentive to do
otherwise."26 As moral responsibility already requires strong reasons-receptivity, the agent must
understand and rationally judge reasons, and thus, according to Fischer and Ravizza, showing that they
are capable of choosing one set of reasons shows that they could choose others.
The last criteria, that an agent must be able to act b sed on their choices, is the simplest. Quite
simply, it just means that the outcome of the reasons-reactive mechanism in the agent must be
connected in the appropriate way to action. If one is completely unable to act in accordance to their
25 Fischer & Ravizza, 1998, pp 70-73
26 Ibid., p 73
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choice, they cannot be held morally responsible.
The Agent
A possible objection to the moderate reasons-responsive ess view is that it too readily assigns
moral responsibility. In some cases, if one is perfectly able to understand reasons, but only capable of
reacting to the most extreme, it seems callous to asign responsibility. Since only weak reasons-
reactivity is required, on the Fischer and Ravizza view, all that is required of a morally responsible
agent is that there be some conceivable set of circumstances in which the agent will choose to do
otherwise. Yet for many cases, someone may be unable to choose to do otherwise in any situation likely
to arise, but may be willing to act otherwise if a very extreme, unlikely set of circumstances is to arise.
If an account holds agents responsible in these sorts of cases, this suggests that the account is wrong.
Take, for example, an extreme agoraphobic who can only muster up the courage to leave his/her
house if he/she is firebombed, or something worse. That is, there is a conceivable set of circumstances
which this agoraphobic would respond to, which means that he/she is weakly-reasons responsive. As
long as the agoraphobic is willing to also leave his/her home if something worse than firebombing
occurs (for example, if their home is fire bombed as well as filled with poisonous gas), then the
agoraphobic has an objectively coherent hierarchy of reasons, meaning that he/she is strongly reasons-
receptive. This makes this individual moderately reasons-responsive – he/she fit the criteria needed, by
Fischer and Ravizza, to be held morally responsible. Yet, if this individual has made many honest
attempts to get over the phobia and have been unable to, it seems wrong to place blame on him/her for
not being able to leave their houses to maintain employment, or attend a wedding. Extreme situations
often bring us to be capable of things that we would not otherwise be able to do. Sometimes people
who are in extreme, life-threatening situations are capable of performing feats of seemingly super-
human strength, lifting much more than they normally would be able to. Yet we do not expect these
same individuals to be able to perform these acts in normal circumstances. In the same way, we should
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not hold one responsible for failing to act a particular way just because in an extreme set of
circumstances they would not fail.
This issue was raised by Mele in response to Fischer and Ravizza.27 In replying to this worry,
Fischer and Ravizza differentiate between moral respon ibility and moral praise/blameworthiness.28 In
their view, to hold someone to be morally responsible is not to say that they are morally blameworthy
or praiseworthy – it is just to say that they meet some standards of being responsible in some sense.
Thus, though they would not want to claim that the agoraphobic is morally blameworthy for failing to
leave the house, they would want to say that the agoraphobic is morally responsible for it, even if no
moral judgement is made based on that action. Mele has pointed out that this is a strange use of terms.
Though there is a difference between one who can do otherwise in at least the most extreme cases, and
one who can not do otherwise no matter what (e.g. an agoraphobic who would rather burn to death than
leave the house), it seems odd to use the term “morally responsible” to denote the former.29 By using
the term “moral responsibility” in this way, it seems the importance of a theory of moral responsibility
has been diminished, and thus the importance of the Fischer and Ravizza model has been diminished.
A different tactic can be taken to deal with cases of individuals who are weakly morally reactive
but do not seem to be morally responsible. One could claim that what these examples illustrate is that it
is not enough to specify that an agent must be moderately reasons-responsive. We also need to worry
about what part of the agent is doing the controlling. In cases of coercion, there is a powerful force
outside of the agent which is forcing the agent to act in a particular way, and thus we do not hold the
agent responsible. Yet there are also cases of internal forces which can completely override the agent's
normal decision making procedure, and force the agent to act in a particular way. If the part of the
agent which is doing the controlling in these cases i  not central to the agent, then, much like the
coercion cases, it seems the agent is being forced by something else to act in a particular way. In the
27 Mele, 2000
28 Fischer & Ravizza, 2000
29 Mele, 2006
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agoraphobia case, it seems the phobia is an affliction that the agents, in some sense, cannot help – they
have made effort to rid themselves of it, and it seems like they are at the mercy of this strange, foreign
phobia.
The Fischer and Ravizza view holds that the mechanism which is reasons-responsive must be
the agent's in some sense. This is a possible way of dealing with the agoraphobic issue – if what
accounts for the agents' actions is the phobia of open spaces, and that phobia is, in some sense, not part
of the agents, then we can abstain from holding them morally responsible in this case.
Fischer and Ravizza hold that what makes a mechanism one's own is taking responsibility for
it.30 According to the Strawsonian account, which Fischer and Ravizza are working within, agents are
responsible because they are held responsible by others. Similarly, Fischer and Ravizza hold that to be
considered responsible for a mechanism, the agent must be willing to accept that mechanism as their
own and be held accountable for the good or ill produced by that mechanism. At some point in the
agents' history, they must take responsibility for a particular mechanism for that mechanism to be
considered part of what they can be held morally responsible for. This does not mean a verbal
commitment must be made – just that certain beliefs and attitudes be held towards that mechanism,
accepting that you are responsible for it. Thus, perhaps it could be said that the agoraphobic is acting on
a mechanism which they have not taken responsibility for, and can therefore not be held responsible
for.
There are two problems with this approach. First, it does not seem that the reasons-responsive
mechanism Fischer and Ravizza have in mind should be able to incorporate or exclude things which
give rise to desires (such as our innate biological drives like hunger, learned preferences, or in this case,
phobias). The mechanism they have in mind is simply one which is able to recognize and respond when
desires form part of a reason to take a particular action. This would explain why, in their response to
Mele, they do not invoke this line of reasoning. Second, it is not clear exactly what is involved in
30 Fischer & Ravizza, 1998, chapter 8
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taking responsibility for a mechanism, so it remains questionable how useful this concept is. However,
there may be a way to maintain the taking responsibility account while admitting the utility of other
accounts. Taking responsibility for a mechanism in th s way is a historical account of responsibility –
that is, it depends on events that have happened in the past which one has no access to in the present.
Most of our judgements about moral responsibility, however, occur without seeming to know whether
at some point in the past the agent we are judging has taken responsibility for the mechanism the action
stemmed from. We are able to hold someone morally responsible without knowing their full history
regarding their reasons-responsive mechanism – it would be an odd world indeed if we were unable to
do so. Even if the account of Fischer and Ravizza is right, this shows that there are some facts about the
world in the present by which we can approximate which mechanisms the agent has taken
responsibility for, and it is worth looking for what these facts are. From within the Fischer and Ravizz
framework, the other positions on this issue can be seen as tracking these facts about the world which
give information about what mechanisms the agent has taken responsibility for. Fleshing out these
other positions may then be more informative than the Fischer and Ravizza picture, even if Fischer and
Ravizza are ultimately right that moral responsibility requires agents to take ownership over their
reasons-responsive mechanism.
True Self and Whole Self
There are many other views on which parts of a person count as part of the morally responsible
agent. We have already seen Harry Frankfurt's view, where a higher-order desire counts as part of the
morally responsible agent if the agent decisively identifies with that desire. In this case, the agent
identifies with a higher-order desire, privileging it above the others. Stump has proposed a revised
Frankfurt account, in which it is the actions we arresponsible for are those which stem from desires
our intellect sides with.31 This is a sort of identification of the agent with the intellect, again privileging
31 Stump, 1993
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this part of the agent as being the part relevant for moral responsibility. Others defend similar views,
such as Dworkin32 and Neely.33 The common thread throughout these views is the privileging of one
part of the agent over all others, making one part of the agent the seat of responsibility.
These views which privilege one part of the agent over thers have been dubbed 'True Self'
views.34 They see one part of the agent as more centrally the self than the other parts, and privilege it
above the others when assigning responsibility. It is certainly plausible that parts of us are more
important and more central to our identity than others, and therefore more important for responsibility.
Certainly this seems to be the case when considering agents with certain pathologies. Yet, to claim that
one particular faculty or type of desire is the part which is central to an agent's identity and
responsibility is to oversimplify. Human beings arem ssy creatures. To privilege one particular part as
being the center of responsibility seems artificial – we are more than any single part of our selves.
In contrast to these views is the Whole Self view. The Whole Self view does not privilege any
particular part of an agent. Instead, it posits that desires and beliefs which are not integrated into the
person's psychology are to be considered as outside forc s acting upon the agent. Those beliefs and
desires that are integrated are part of the self. Rgardless of whether the intellect or higher-order desires
affirm an integrated desire or not, it is a part of he agent's self and therefore the agent is responsible for
any actions stemming from it. While higher-order desir s and the judgement of the intellect may tell us
something about how integrated a desire is, they ar not necessary for responsibility. A self-deceived
businesswoman who thinks she is acting on the most honest of desires, but unconsciously is driven by
greed, is responsible, since her actions are stemming from a part of who she is – a greedy human being.
There is an interesting type of counterexample to the True Self views which help to highlight
the advantages of the Whole Self view. Arpaly brings up cases of inverse akrasia, pointing out that it is




35 Arpaly & Schroeder, 1999
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action despite judging it to not be the best available option (all things considered). Inverse akrasia is
performing an action which one judges (wrongly) to not be best. Thus inversely akratic actions form a
proper subset of akratic actions – those in which our judgement is wrong, but our desires seem to be
tracking the better option.
An often cited example of inverse akrasia is Huckleberry Finn. 
As Huckleberry becomes the friend of Jim, a runaway sl ve, his conventional southern moral
convictions tell him clearly that he should proceed to return the slave to his lawful owner. He
knows, so he believes, what the right thing to do is. To his embarrassment, however,
Huckleberry finds himself psychologically incapable of doing what he believes to be the right
thing. When an opportunity comes to turn Jim in, he feels too sick at heart, and displays what he
takes to be weakness of will. He just cannot do it. Eventually he completely gives up the idea of
turning Jim in, and consequently decides that he is a weak, bad boy, and that being moral is far
too hard and thankless a task.36
It is debatable to what extent Huck is morally responsible in this case. On the one hand, he judged that
what would be best is if he turned in his friend Jim. On the other hand, he did not act on this judgment
due to his sympathy for Jim. What is clear, though, is that the True Self theories have a difficult time
capturing this difficulty in assigning Huck (or others in similar circumstances) blame or praise. If Huck
is responsible for the judgements of his intellect or for his high-level desires, it seems we should only
be looking at his judgement that he should turn Jim in, and disregard that it was his sympathy which
kept him from doing this. This seems to oversimplify the case.
The Whole Self View, put forward and defended by Arpaly and Schroeder,37 avoids many of the
issues the True Self views run into. This is a view which does not hold the self to be any particular part
of the agent, but rather, holds that the degree to which a desire or value is psychologically integrated is
what determines whether the agent is accountable for acting upon it. Desires, regardless of whether
they are first-order or higher, can stem from deep within a person's psychology, and thus be just as
much a part of them as their conscious choices. On this account, what matters is that desires be well-
integrated into the agent's psychology. Thus, this view can better handle the ambiguity of the Huck
36 Arpaly & Schroeder, 1999, p 162
37 Ibid.
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case. It is difficult to blame Huck for his conviction that turning his friend in is the right thing to do,
because his qualms with taking this action may stem fro  deep within his character. 
To be more specific, Arpaly and Schroeder hold that a belief or desire are well-integrated to the
extent that “(1) they are deep; and (2) they do not oppose other deep beliefs or desires.”38 They go on to
explain what is meant by this:
A belief or desire is deep insofar as it is a powerful force in determining the actor’s behavior,
deeply held, deeprooted. Deep beliefs tend to resist revision (one’s belief that one speaks a
language is thus very deep; one’s belief that there is still half a jug of milk left is much
shallower) and deep desires tend to be satisfied with preference over shallower desires in
contexts where a choice is forced (the desire to give emotional support to one’s lover is deeper
than one’s desire to eat a healthy lunch each day, even though these desires might rarely or
never in fact conflict). Beliefs and desires oppose each other when they can’t all be true
(beliefs) or satisfied (desires).
In the case of Huckleberry, Huck does not have a history of being motivated by racism, and his racist
ideology (passed down by authority figures) is opposed by his sympathy, which seems to go much
deeper. The depth of his racism and sympathy are up for debate, which leads to some room for
ambiguity about this case.
To better illustrate the Whole Self view, take the cases of Lana and Greg.39 Both Lana and Greg
are kleptomaniacs – that is, both have urges to steal items of trivial worth, not for their worth or utility.
These urges are not explainable by any need or desire other than the urge to take the items. Both Lana
and Greg believe that stealing is morally wrong andfi  their urges embarrassing. Both want to stop
stealing, and make efforts towards this goal. They differ in an important way, however. Lana has no
positive feelings towards her stealing. Her urges make her life more difficult, and when she steals she
feels guilty and often goes back to secretly return he item. Greg, on the other hand, has some positive
feelings towards his stealing. Though he thinks stealing is wrong and is somewhat embarrassed by it,
he often thinks about his stealing and smiles to himself about it. He is somewhat resentful towards
respectable people, and he finds it pleasurable to think back to the people in the stores he steals from,
38 Ibid., p 173
39 Example taken from Arpaly & Schroeder, 1999
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looking foolish as he operates behind their backs. He is attracted by risky and exciting endeavours
outside of his stealing, and his friends (who do not know about his stealing) think that he ought to take
life more seriously.
Of these two kleptomaniacs, it is hard not to treat them differently. In the case of Lana, whether
we hold her somewhat responsible or not, it seems clear that in some sense she is not fully responsible
for her actions. She seems to be a genuine victim of an affliction – she gains no pleasure from stealing,
feels guilty about it, and even returns the items she steals. Her kleptomania seems in deep conflict with
the rest of her values. Though we may be more sympathetic towards Greg than someone who steals out
of greed or entirely out of malice, Greg seems much more at ease with his stealing than Lana. He gains
some pleasure from it, though he has made attempts to quit he does not seem too genuinely upset by his
stealing, and he seems to enjoy other similarly risky and irresponsible behaviours.
Arpaly and Schroeder, the originators of this example, attribute the difference in attitudes
towards Lana and Greg to stem from the different degre s to which their kleptomania are
psychologically integrated. Arpaly and Schroeder's concept of psychological integration seems like a
plausible and useful concept with which to deal with these cases. However, there are many areas in the
account which are troubling or require elucidation. 
First, the explanation of when beliefs and desires oppose each other seems too weak. According
to Arpaly and Schroeder, beliefs and desires oppose each other only when they are logically mutually
exclusive. Intuitively, it seems that beliefs and desires should be able to oppose each other to various
degrees – a belief may make others less likely to be true, or satisfying one desire may make others
more difficult to satisfy. For example, a belief tha  a friend owns a house may make it seem less likely
that this friend also rents an apartment, though it does not logically rule out the possibility; satisfy ng
one's desire for alcohol may make satisfying one's d sire to get work done more difficult, but not
impossible. Unwilling addicts may technically be able to satisfy any of their desires in addition to their
desire for drugs, it will just be made more difficult. This issue could fairly easily be solved by having
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desires and beliefs able to oppose each other to vari us degrees – the strongest degree when they are
mutually exclusive, and moving down the spectrum as it becomes progressively easier to satisfy both.
This introduces another issue which needs to be resolv d: we all have desires which oppose each other
to some extent, which seem perfectly a part of our “Whole Self”. We need a method of differentiating
those desires which are just at odds with some of our other deep desires, and those that truly are so
opposed by our deep desires that they are not truly a part of us.
A more serious problem with the Whole Self account is that, though we intuitively have some
idea of what sorts of traits are integrated and to what degree, Arpaly and Schroeder do not give us a
particularly strong definition of what psychological integration amounts to. We are told that a desire i
well-integrated to the extent that they are deep and that they do not oppose other deep desires. While
this is helpful and suggestive, the definition they give of “deep” is circular. A deep desire is “deeply
held” and “deeprooted”. While we are told two properties that deep desires have – that they tend to
resist revision and they tend to be satisfied with preference over shallower desires – this, again, is
merely suggestive, and not particularly explanatory. A much more satisfying definition of psychological
integration may go a long way to strengthening the Whole Self account.
We are left with two connected problems with the Whole Self account. The first is that we need
some method of differentiating a person with a normal amount of integration and opposing desires
from someone with a desire which is truly foreign to the self. The second is that we do not have a
satisfying definition of psychological integration. The next chapter will deal with these issues.
Conclusion
I have outlined some of the requirements for an agent to be morally responsible. Following
Fischer and Ravizza, I suggest that an important part of being morally responsible is being reasons-
responsive. I also suggest that the desires one is acting on must be an integrated part of the agent – that
is, they must be well-integrated in the agent's psychology. Taken together, this gives a powerful view of
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what is required for moral responsibility, leaving the question of indeterminism to the side. However,
the Whole Self view has left us with some residual issues, which will be dealt with in the next chapter.
Two interesting, related issues have yet to be addressed.. The first is the role of self-control.
Some cases of inverse-akrasia were briefly mentioned, but there are many cases of agents who fail to
keep themselves from acting on a strong (but not overwhelming) desire which is not well-integrated.
On the Whole Self account, acting on one desire over another shows, all else being equal, that one is
deeper than the other. What can we say about self-control, and those who are particularly bad (or good)
at it? It is difficult, with the view sketched thus far, to distinguish between someone who has a nearly
irresistible, poorly integrated desire for sweets, and one who likes sweets and simply is terrible at
controlling themselves. In many cases, it seems like we want to hold people responsible, even if they
are acting on something that is not well integrated, because we think they should have been able to
control themselves. 
The second issue is the role of judgement. Sometimes, w  judge poorly, which causes us to act
in a way not fully stemming from a well-integrated part of ourselves. Can we be held responsible for
poor judgement, and if so, under what circumstances? Both judgement and self-control will be




In the last chapter, I introduced the idea of the Whole Self, defended by Arpaly and Shroeder.40
This view holds that an agent is to be held morally responsible for actions which stem in the
appropriate way from some well-integrated aspect of their psychology. Thus, actions stemming from
the addictions of unwilling addicts, or the compulsion  of patients with Obsessive Compulsive
Disorder, are not the sort of thing an agent can be held accountable for, since these actions stem froa
poorly integrated desire within the agent. The Whole Self view left us with two related issues: The first
is that we need some method of differentiating a person with a normal amount of integration and
opposing desires from someone with a desire which is truly foreign to the self. The second, which is
required to answer the first, is that we do not have  satisfying definition of psychological integration.
In this chapter, I introduce the Deep Self view, in order to bring some clarity to these issues. The
Deep Self is similar to Arpaly and Shroeder's Whole Self – it is made up of the parts of the agent which
really are central to that agent. By comparing and connecting the two views, I attempt to shed some
light on the issues left by the Whole Self alone. The concept of the Whole Self will be brought into
greater focus, but, I will argue, the concept is necessarily fuzzy. It is a folk-psychological concept,
which people use in their attributions of praise and blame. Our attributions of praise and blame
themselves are imprecise – there are plenty of cases which fall into some sort of grey area. We should
therefore be wary of any attempt to offer a rigorous, precise definition of what these attributions are
tracking.
After the discussion of when an agent is morally responsible for an action, I move into a
discussion of when an agent is not morally responsible. I claim that one way for an agent to lack
responsibility is if their actions stem from a broken cognitive mechanism. In many cases of
40 Arpaly & Shroeder, 1999
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pathologies, there are physiological problems – certain neurological mechanisms are malfunctioning. In
these cases, it is the faulty mechanism which has cau ed the action, and thus we can rule out that the
action was caused by some deep aspect of the agent's psychology, and thus the agent is not to be held
responsible. These faulty cognitive  mechanisms caue  disconnect between agents' Deep Selves and
their actions, and serve as an external factor causing the agents' actions.
Deep Self
Chandra Sripada has put forward the Deep Self model,41 which is in many ways similar to
Arpaly and Schroeder's Whole Self view. The Deep Self vi w, like the Whole Self view, posits that
attribution of moral responsibility is connected with the deep aspects of an agent's psychology. The
Deep Self is made up of the agent's values, principles, and life goals. The parts of the Deep Self have
many of the same characteristics as Arpaly and Schroeder's conception of well-integrated desires. For
example, acting in accordance with them generally will take priority over satisfying less deep goals,
and these personality traits are stable and unlikely to change. It seems plausible that the sorts of traits
Sripada would be considered well-integrated traits on the Whole Self account. There are some
characteristics of Deep Self traits which Sripada ads which the Whole Self view does not attribute to
well-integrated desires. For example, Deep Self characteristics tend to be central to the agent's self-
identity, and the agent will tend to reflectively endorse these traits – though this latter characteristic is
one the Whole Self view fairly explicitly rejects acentral. Attitudes which are part of the Deep Self
also are more general than traits which are less deep.
Sripada gives some evidence for his claim that the raits he identifies as part of the Deep Self
are central to ascriptions of praise and blame. Take the following scenario:
The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board and said, ‘We are thinking
of starting a new program. It will help us increase profits, but it will also harm the
environment.’
The chairman of the board answered, ‘I don’t care at all about harming the
41 Sripada, 2010
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environment. I just want to make as much profit as I can. Let’s start the new
program.’
They started the new program. Sure enough, the environment was harmed.
Contrast this with the similar case:
The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board and said, ‘We are thinking
of starting a new program. It will help us increase profits, and it will also help the environment.’
The chairman of the board answered, ‘I don’t care at all about helping the environment. I just
want to make as much profit as I can. Let’s start the new program.’
They started the new program. Sure enough, the environment was helped.42
It seems intuitive that in the first condition, we blame the chairman for opting for a program that will
harm the environment. In the second, we do not credit the chairman for helping the environment. There
is some evidence to suggest these intuitions are held by a majority of people.43 Yet these two cases are
very closely analogous – in both, the chairman is making a decision between pursuing a project or not,
and the project is said to increase profits. The chairman makes it clear in both that he does not care
about the environment, and so the environmental effects are just a side-effect of his attempts to increase
profits. Why, then, is there an asymmetry in how we assign credit for the resulting effects on the
environment?
Joshua Knobe, the originator of these vignettes, suggests the hypothesis that “People's
judgements [about intentionality] depend in a crucial way on what [the action] happens to be. In
particular, it makes a great deal of difference whether they think that [the action] is something good r
something bad.”44 Knobe contends that the reason we assign intentionality to the chairman who harms
the environment, but do not do so the chairman who helps it, because of the moral valence of the side-
effect. The asymmetry between our attributions of intentionality in the two cases stem from an
asymmetry in how we view good and bad actions. Thisexplanation, however, has problems with the
42 Both scenarios are from Sripada, 2010, p. 161
43 Knobe (2003) reports that, of 78 people asked in Mahatten public park, 82% of people said that in the first condition,
harm to the environment was intentional, while 77% said that the help to the environment was not intentional. 




Jake desperately wants to have more money. He knows that he will inherit a lot of money when
his aunt dies. One day, he sees his aunt walking by the window. He raises his rifle, gets her in
the sights, and presses the trigger. But John isn’t very good at using his rifle. His hand slips on
the barrel of the gun, and the shot goes wild…Nonethel ss, the bullet hits her directly in the
heart. She dies instantly.
Selfless Soldier
Klaus is a soldier in the German army during World War II. His regiment has been sent on a
mission that he believes to be deeply immoral. He knows that many innocent people will die
unless he can somehow stop the mission before it is completed. One day, it occurs to him that
the best way to sabotage the mission would be to sho t a bullet into his own regiment’s
communication device.
He knows that, if he gets caught shooting the device, he may be imprisoned, tortured or even
killed. He could try to pretend that he was simply making a mistake – that he just got confused
and thought the device belonged to the enemy – but he is almost certain that no one will believe
him. With that thought in mind, he raises his rifle, g ts the device in his sights, and presses the
trigger. But Klaus isn’t very good at using his rifle. His hand slips on the barrel of the gun, and
the shot goes wild…Nonetheless, the bullet lands directly in the communications device. The
mission is foiled, and many innocent lives are saved.45
In both these cases, most subjects (over 90%) presented with these scenarios say that the result was
intentional. This calls into question the notion that it is the moral valence of the consequence which
affects our attributions of intentionality, as Knobe posits.
Sripada explains this asymmetry by applying the Deep S lf model he has developed: in cases
where the effect of an action is in concordance with the person's Deep Self, we see the act as
intentional, and then assign praise or blame. In both of the chairman examples, it is made clear that the
chairman values profits over the environment. In only the first scenario was the effect concordant with
these values – the environment suffered because of the chairman's values. We do not give the chairman
credit for helping the environment in the second scenario, since the beneficial effect on the
environment does not derive from the chairman's valuing of the environment. Although we may see the
chairman as of a questionable moral character, there is no effect in the second scenario that we can
blame him for. In the Aunt Killer and Selfless Soldier scenarios, the results of the actions are in line
45 Sripada, 2010, p. 170-171
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with the actor's Deep Self, and therefore the actor is judged as having intentionally brought about the
result. Thus, it is when an agent is acting in a way th t reveals their Deep Self that they are perceived as
responsible for those actions.
Deep, Whole Self
Sripada does not give a precise definition of the De p Self, or a method of discovering whether
a particular value is part of the Deep Self or not.He is satisfied with an imprecise definition, precis ly
because he sees the Deep Self as a folk-psychologica  concept people use when assigning moral praise
or blame. This makes sense. If our intuitions about responsibility are tracking something like the Deep
Self, it could very well be a fairly fuzzy concept. This does not mean that the Deep Self is not a useful
concept for differentiating different cases of potential moral responsibility – it just means that there
may inevitably be some amount of imprecision in the concept. There are many cases where it is not
clear that we should hold someone responsible, and we should be wary of a view which divides cases
up with too much precision – a view of responsibility should make sense of why we are puzzled by
marginal cases, but see central cases as clear-cut, and it seems the Deep Self may fit this bill. We may
need to content ourselves with suggestive, but not rig rous, definitions of the Deep Self to explain our
intuitions about moral responsibility. This may be why the definition of well-integrated, from the
Whole Self view, is similarly fuzzy. Both of these accounts are able to give suggestions about the sorts
of traits which we see as a core part of the agent, but neither can give a full definition.
One of the questions the Whole Self account left us with in the last chapter was what is meant
by “well-integrated”. According to the Whole Self view, we are responsible for actions when the
movitvation is well integrated. Similarly, the Deep Self view posits that we assign responsibility to
agents for their actions if their actions stem from part of their Deep Self. The descriptions given of
well-integrated desires and the traits associated with the Deep Self have much in common, and it seems
these are just two different angles taken of the same concept. Henceforth, I will use the terms “well-
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integrated” and “Deep Self” such that “well-integrated” is an adjective for parts of the Deep Self, and
every part of the Deep Self is well-integrated. 
I have suggested that though neither Arpaly or Sripada give a rigorous definition of the Deep
Self, a rigorous definition may not be possible, and the suggestive nature of the two accounts may be
the best that can be done. The best answer to the question of what “well-integrated” means may just be
a suggestive list of characteristics. Some of the characteristics of well-integrated or Deep Self traits re:
 They are enduring
 They often motivate the agent to action, forming recu ring patterns of behaviour
 They are general, not specific
 The agent tends to reflectively endorse them
 They are central to the agent's self-conception
 They are not in deep conflict with other traits
Again, these are suggestive, characteristic properties. None of them are necessary or sufficient, and this
list is probably not exhaustive.
The first characteristic, that Deep Self/well-integrated traits tend to be enduring, is found in
both the Deep Self and Whole Self account. This seem  fairly intuitive. Though people do change,
changes tend to occur over long periods of time. Th deep aspects of a person's personality and values
do not generally change over night. When a radical ch nge seems to occur rapidly, we generally posit
some special factor which has caused this – a mid-life crisis, or brainwashing from an ideologue.
The two views also agree that these traits generally h ve significant motivational force, and
(since they are enduring) tend to form recurring patterns of behaviour. If an agent claimed to care very
much about the environment, yet never seemed to act in ways to prevent environmental harm, we
would question whether this really is a particularly deep value. An important characteristic which the
Whole Self view does not mention is that deep values and desires tend to be general. Placing a high
value on a particular, such as purchasing energy-efficient light-bulbs, is less deep than the more general
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value of reducing one's energy consumption, which in turn is less deep than desiring to do less harm to
the environment. The shallower, more specific desires are working in service of the deeper, more
general. If it turned out that buying energy-efficient light-bulbs actually did more harm to the
environment than good (for example, by producing much more pollutants in the manufacturing process
than competitors), the more specific desire would evaporate. The deeper value, however, would be
much more difficult to change, and seems much more central to what sort of person the agent is.
The next item, that the agent tends to reflectively endorse deep attitudes, is put forward by
Sripada. Arpaly and Schroeder argue46 that consciously endorsing one set of attitudes is not necessary
or sufficient for deep attitudes – and this seems very likely to be the case, as cases like Huck Finn's
show. However, it also seems that, in general, agents usually tend to endorse their core values when
reflecting on them. Though there may be many counterexamples, this does not cast doubt on the
general tendency for people to consciously agree with the values which make up who they are. This
brings us to the second last item – deep traits tend to be central to the agent's self-conception. If it is
true that, in general, deep attitudes are reflectivly endorsed by the agent, it seems to follow that t ese
values are also going to play a role in the agent's self-conception. Though there are many instances
where we are deluded and have a distorted conception of ur selves, values which we see as central to
who we are are more likely to be deeply ingrained than ones we do not see as important to us.
Conflicts of desire
The final point is found exclusively in the Whole Slf view. The claim is that a desire is well-
integrated insofar as it is deep and not in conflict with other deep desires. Two desires are in conflict i
it is not possible to satisfy them both or, as I argued in the last chapter, if satisfying one makes it more
difficult to satisfy the other. However, this criteon seems controversial. It is obvious that in many
cases – such as unwilling addicts and OCD patients tired of their compulsions – there is a conflict
between the agents' deep desires and their addiction or pathology. However, it is also true that many
46 Arpaly & Shroeder, 1999
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desires, which seem to be very much a part of us, are in conflict. Most cases of weakness of will seem
to demonstrate this. The dieter's desire to lose weight is constantly pitted against tempting sweets; yet,
we do not want to claim that the dieter's desire fo sweets is not well-integrated, since – according to
the Whole Self view – this would mean that the dieter is not responsible for actions stemming from
such a desire.
It seems that in these cases, there is sufficient integration to hold people responsible, despite
conflicts. Yet if both the desire to lose weight and the desire for sweets are deep and well-integrated, w
have an example of two deep desires which are in pretty serious conflict for which the agent is
responsible. There are numerous other examples – the desire to do work is often in conflict with the
desire to play; the desire to be generous is in confli t with the desire to accumulate wealth; the desire to
be well-respected can come into conflict with the desire to be moral. Patricia Marino makes the case47
that holding even essentially conflicting desires – wanting A and not-A – is not irrational, and there a
many examples of such desire pairs which seem perfectly fine. For example, two friends with a friendly
rivalry competing in a race may want, at the same ti , their friend/rival to both win and not win.
Though these desires are in essential conflict, they ar  understandable, and it does not seem that the
conflict between them makes either one seem more external to the agent. These seem like values and
desires which we want to say are a part of the Deep Self, and which, in general, we would want to hold
an agent responsible for acting upon, despite the recognition of the conflicts.
As has been mentioned, none of the points are meant to be necessary or sufficient conditions.
However, the issue with this last item seem concerning. If many of our deep values and desires are in
conflict, it seems we are put in a position with two options: Conclude that conflict between desires and
values is irrelevant (or at least, a very weak factor), or try to differentiate the sorts of conflicts which
are acceptable within the Deep Self, and those which indicate a desire outside of the agent's Deep Self.
The former option is disagreeable, since it seems that a very strong factor which curbs our blame of
47 Marino, 2009
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unwilling addicts (or patients with OCD or other, similar pathologies) is that they are unwilling – they
have strong inclinations and values against continuing substance use.
There do, though, seem to be differences between the ormal conflicts within each of us and the
conflicts which occur within an unwilling addict. For one thing, there is a difference of extreme. While
my interest in being healthy and avoiding empty calories is often in conflict with my sweet-tooth, this
is hardly comparable to addicts who are unable to pursue many things of deep value due to their
addictions dictating large portions of their lives. A person with a serious addiction may find it difficult
to: maintain a job, maintain relationships and social status, pursue other desires which require financial
resources, stay healthy, etc. Someone with a sweet-tooth, on the other hand, is only affected in a very
limited number of ways (namely, that they will have trouble maintaining a balanced diet – an issue
most of us face), and is unlikely to face temptations as difficult to resist as the drug addict's.
Furthermore, many unwilling addicts seek ways to lessen or eliminate their addictions, by abstaining
from drugs, attending addictions counseling, and/or going to drug treatment clinics. That is, the agent's
deep values can sometimes lead to very costly actions for the sole purpose of attempting to eliminate
the conflicting desire. It seems, then, that an important factor in differentiating normal value conflicts
and the sorts of conflicts addicts face is to appeal to the strength of this conflict, and the strength of the
deep values being opposed. When the conflict is extremely strong, especially when it leads to costly
actions to eliminate one of the desires, it seems rea onable to say this becomes a factor (though again,
not a sufficient or necessary one) against that desire being well-integrated.
Connections and Hard Cases
We can now test some of the above-listed characteristics of deep-self traits by pitting them up
against some hard cases. In so doing, we will further refine the characteristics by drawing connections
and relations between them. The issue with the chara teristics as they currently stand is that many cases
in which we would not want to assign responsibility seem to fit many of these characteristics. The
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worry is that these characteristics may be an intuit ve folk-theory, but does not actually demarcate cases
of actions which stem from the deep-self, but rather just give some post-hoc rationalization for it.
Imagine a cocaine addict, Andy. Andy became addicte to cocaine as a teenager, when he was
peer-pressured into using it on numerous occasions. Now, 20 years later, Andy is still addicted. His
addicting has obviously been enduring, having lasted many years. It has also caused recurring
behaviour – Andy needs to seek out and use cocaine on a fairly regular basis. The desire for cocaine is
not particularly general – it is for a particular sort of substance – and Andy knows, on reflection, that
this addiction is detrimental to his life. But the addiction has been a part of Andy's life for so long, it
has become a part of his self-conception.
Andy's addiction definitely has 3 out of the 6 characteristics listed above – it is enduring, causes
recurring patterns of behaviour, and is part of his self-conception. Yet he is also an unwilling addict, it
seems plausible to say he is not responsible for his addiction – he began using cocaine as an immature
teenager, and it can be said that in many ways he ia d fferent person now. He would not have begun
using cocaine if he had been a mature adult. Assuming that Andy has attempted to quit using the
resources available to him and that he honestly stil  struggles with this addiction, it seems at least
plausible that we should not say Andy is responsible when he succumbs to his addiction.
Are three characteristics enough to make a trait a part of the deep-self? Compare Andy to a
miser, Mary. Mary is extremely greedy when it comes to money, but not with anything else – hence, her
desire for wealth is no more general than Andy's want for cocaine. She simply likes the feeling of
having wealth – to see large numbers in her bank account statement gives her pleasure, even though she
does not wish to use this wealth for anything in particular. Her miserliness is not part of her self-
conception – she rationalizes her actions towards money in such a way that it never occurs to her that
she has any particular affinity for money. Her greed also rarely conflicts with her other deep desires –
she does not place a high value on her living conditions or generosity. Although Andy and Mary both
only have three of the six characteristics, it seems Mary is more responsible for her actions than Andy
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is of his.
It seems, on the face of it, Andy's recognition of his addiction as part of himself does not really
make us more likely to make him responsible – take his characteristic out of his story, and nothing
seems changed. It seems that this is because he holds it as part of his self-conception while at the same
time does not reflectively endorse it. He grudgingly accepts his addiction as part of who he is, but he
wishes that it was not. In the terms of Frankfurt,48 Andy has a first-order desire for cocaine, but his
higher-order desires are in conflict with this desir  – he does not want to want cocaine. Andy, on
reflection, knows that his addiction is a bad thing. Not only does Andy realize his addiction is negative,
but he is also serious enough in this judgement to have made attempts to eliminate it. His reflective
judgement seems to take on a privileged position among the criteria – if his reflective judgement
approves of a desire, considering it a part of his self-conception may help to solidify this trait as a part
of his Deep Self, but without the reflective endorsement, or even reflective opposition, Andy's self-
conception on this matter does not seem to change our valuation of responsibility.
As noted in the previous section, conflicting desir alone does not mean that a desire is not
well-integrated. However, certain sorts of conflicts do – when the conflict is of such a kind that it is
strong and one is motivated to eliminate a desire, this speaks against the integration of that desire. This
surely requires some amount of reflective opposition o the desire, as well as the opposing desires being
motivating. Again, it seems reflective endorsement or opposition is important for deep-self traits.
Reflective endorsement seems to play a fairly central role. However, it is not as simple as
claiming that reflective endorsement is the only characteristic required – as has been argued in the
previous chapter, this over-simplifies. Frankfurt's heavy emphasis on reflective endorsement49 stems
from the fact that reflective endorsement is so important, but even in cases where the agent's reflective
judgement is obviously against a desire, it may still not be clear whether the agent acting on it is
responsible (see the case of Huckleberry Finn in the previous chapter).
48 Frankfurt, 1987
49 For example, in Frankfurt, 1987
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Assigning Praise and Blame
In the last section, I combined the insights of the Whole Self and Deep Self views, and argued
that what they are getting at may be complex with many interacting characteristics. I then listed a
number of these characteristics. This, I suggest, may be the best we can do to answer the question
posed in the last chapter about what it means for adesire to be well-integrated. I also attempted to
suggest one way in which unwanted addictions differ from the regular conflicting values we all hold –
cases of addiction seem on the extreme end of confli ti g values. In this section, I want to look
specifically at how the view I have been outlining might be used to assign praise and blame, and use
this to illustrate the differences between cases where we do not hold agents responsible (such as in
certain cases of addictions and pathologies) and cases in which we do.
We all, as human beings, make judgements about who is responsible for what. Any layman,
completely uneducated in moral philosophy, is willing and able to judge whether a person is
responsible for any particular action. Much of the time, these judgements are just based on simple facts,
adduced or observed, about the case at hand – did the person know the consequences of the action?
Was the action accidental, or was it intended? Could an alternative action have been taken? Etc. We are
also able to pass judgements on the harder cases which have continually resurfaced here – cases of
addictions and pathologies. Most people would agree that people suffering from severe Obsessive
Compulsive Disorder, who spend many hours every day scrubbing their hands, are not responsible for
failing to take advantage of their time in a more us f l way.
What, then, is it that these everyday judgements are tr cking? What is the common thread
which binds all of these different cases together? In the previous chapter, we discussed the reasons-
responsive view of Fischer and Ravizza, which holds that a person is responsible as long as their
actions stem from their own reasons-responsive mechanism.50 That is, if an agent is able to judge
reasons in an appropriate fashion, and react to reasons, and these reactions come from a mechanism
50 Fischer & Ravizza, 1998
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which can appropriately be called the agent's own, then the agent is responsible. The trouble comes in
defining what makes such a mechanism one's own, and dealing with the difficult cases where it is not
entirely clear whether a particular reaction is coming from the agent or from something better
conceived as outside of the agent. In the latter part of the first chapter, and in this chapter thus far, it has
been suggested that agents are responsible for actins which stem from some part of their deep-self.
This, however, gets this somewhat backwards. As was briefly pointed out in chapter 1, if we take
something like the Strawsonian account,51 then, as Watson has pointed out,52 i  is not that we hold
people responsible because they are responsible, but that it is part of a human practice of holding each
other accountable. That is, judgements about responsibility should be taken to be much more central to
the notion of responsibility. Anything which seems to track our intuitions about responsibility tracks
responsibility by virtue of lining up with our judgements, which hold the true nature of responsibility.
Therefore, it is worth making clear the (perhaps obvi us) point about how exactly we make judgements
about responsibility.
The point is this: we hold someone responsible when w  think that their actions reveal
something morally important about their deep-self. If it seems that the action stems from the agent's ill
will in some way – that is comes from the agent's selfish desires, or desire to inflict pain in others –
then we consider them blameworthy. We also seem sometimes to hold people responsible when the
outcome is caused by a failing, such as poor judgement or thoughtlessness. One possibility is that these
cases actually reveal something deep about a person's values – the lack of effort put into planning, or
lack of salience of a particular issue, may reveal something deep about an agent. Perhaps we also blame
people for a lack of good judgement, because their lack of good judgement reveals a failure to cultivate
good judgement, which may stem from a lack of a deep value for judging correctly. However, it seems
like it may be special pleading to claim that this is the explanation for all such cases, and so perhas we
also hold people responsible for certain failings (particularly in judgement). Setting these possible cases
51 That is, the account put forward in P.F. Strawson, 1962
52 Watson, 1987
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aside, the general principle is this: if an action reveals, or allows observers to predict, the deep-slf of
the actor, then the actor is held responsible (and thus is responsible). Note that the proper interpretation
of “reveals” or “allows”, in the preceding statement, is required to disallow responsibility for actions
which, though not stemming from a deep-trait, stilllead observers to the correct conclusion that the
actor has some particular deep-trait. So, for example, an evil genius bent on causing wide-spread
misery may be wrongly held responsible for contributing to global warming through the releasing of
some pollutant if the releasing of that pollutant was done without knowledge of the environmental
effects. Although the releasing of this pollutant may lead observers to (rightly) assume that the evil
genius is evil, upon learning that he had no knowledge of the effects of this pollutant, responsibility for
this action wanes. There must be the proper connection between the deep trait and the actions of the
agent – the predictive power gained by the observers must not be accidental.
Faulty Mechanisms and Responsibility
I have attempted to flesh out and connect the Whole Se f and deep-self views in order to shed
some light on what sorts of desires we are responsible for acting on. There is another way of
approaching this issue, and that is to look for what sorts of desires we are not responsible for acting
upon. This will serve to provide additional means to demarcate the desires we are responsible for acting
upon, and those we are not.
I wish to here focus on brain mechanisms. In many of the cases which have been discussed thus
far – addictions of various sorts and Obsessive Compulsive Disorder – there is something wrong in the
agent's brain. That is, some mechanism is not functio ing as it should. This requires some amount of
caution, however. We do not wish to end up saying that “My brain made me do it” is an adequate moral
(or legal) defense against responsibility. As Arpaly has said, “If the mental can be reduced to the
physical (or materialism is otherwise true), then all mental states are, at bottom, physical states
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[emphasis in original].”53 So explaining that a particular action was caused by a physical circumstance
in no way differentiates it from any other action. There is almost certainly something about a murderes
brain which “made them” commit the murder, but this is not necessarily a defense against
responsibility – if the only real difference between the murderer's brain and any pacifist's corresponds
to a difference in personality, then this is not the sort of brain difference the murderer can appeal to in
order to dodge responsibility.
The sort of issue that can mitigate or eliminate responsibility is one in which there is a
legitimate problem in the functioning of some brain mechanism. That is, some brain mechanism is
simply not working within the range of typical functioning. Take, for example, Obsessive Compulsive
Disorder.54 People suffering from this disorder are plagued by o sessions, thoughts which repeat over
and over, despite being unwanted. More important for our purposes here, sufferers also carry out
compulsions, behaviours which the subject generally knows are nonsensical, but feel compelled to do
them regardless. Although the behaviours are generally fairly common behaviours that many of us may
habitually do more often than strictly necessary, as personal quirks, in OCD patients, it is taken to the
extreme, becoming pathological. People with OCD may, for example, have a compulsion towards hand
washing. Though some people without OCD no doubt wash their hands more often than necessary,
someone with OCD can spend hours in a day washing teir hands, without feeling any behavioural
closure to the matter. They continue to feel the need to wash, just as people with OCD who are
“checkers” will continually check to see if, for example, their door is locked, and will be continually
hounded with thoughts of what could happen if the door is unlocked, compelling them to check yet
again.
OCD and its symptoms have been linked to three areas in the brain: the orbitofrontal cortex, the
anterior cingulate cortex, and the basal ganglia. Subjects with brain lesions in these areas (both humans
and animals) have been studied, and the results sugge t that these three areas are implicated both in
53 Arpaly, 2005
54 Graybiel & Rauch, 2000
39
OCD patients and with OCD-like behaviour. Together, these three areas form what is sometimes called
the “OCD circuit”.55
The orbitofrontal cortex is associated with forming behavioural plans based on estimates of
positive or negative consequences of particular plans.56 When lesions are present in this area, it can lead
to a mismatch between the expected outcome of a particul  action and the behaviour of the subject –
simply put, the mechanism which weights the value of different actions seems to be affected by these
sorts of lesions. Thus, such a lesion may cause a fe ling towards a specific action that is far out of
proportion with the actual value of that action, which may lead to repetitive action. The anterior
cingulate cortex is associated with motivation and ffective behaviour. It is closely connected with the
motor cortex, and plays a role in action selection. Together, these regions of the brain play a very
important role in action selection: “As part of a cortical network, then, the orbitofrontal cortex and
anterior cingulate cortex could together exert a powerful influence both on the perceived emotional
value of stimuli and on the selection of behavioral responses based on these experience-based
expectancies and perceived outcomes.”57
The basal ganglia plays a role in habit formation. O e hypothesis contends that it may not only
play a role in motor habit formation, but cognitive habits as well. This hypothesis puts down OCD to a
dysfunction of the loop between the basal ganglia and neocortex.58 Instead of helping to form normal
patterns, in a dysfunctional cortico-basal ganglia loop, pathologically recurring thought patterns
(obsessions) are caused, along with repetitive actions (compulsions).
The neurobiology of OCD is far from being completely understood, but from what is known it
is clear that there are certain neurological mechanisms which are not functioning the way they should –
some form of lesion or neurochemical imbalance causes these mechanisms to malfunction. Patients
with OCD often recognize their behaviours as irrational, but feel forced by something beyond their
55 Graybiel & Rauch, 2000, p. 344
56 Damasio et al, 1990
57 Graybiel & Rauch, 2000, p. 344
58 Ibid., p. 345
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control to perform them. The compulsive behaviours individuals with OCD engage in are a product of
bad brain mechanisms, they do not derive from higher-level concepts, such as values or personality
traits. Though these are different levels of description, which is part of the reason caution is required
when taking this sort of tack, in this case the description of the neurological mechanisms (and their
failings) involved is more explanatory than any description from a higher-level. It gives us a way of
understanding why there seems to be this set of individuals who engage in similarly bizarre behaviours
– the reason is that, in these individuals, there is a similar malfunction in a mechanism we all have.
Similarly, there are many cases of people with Parkinson's Disease who, when put on
medication to treat the disorder, develop gambling addictions or other similar issues.59 The issue seems
to be that the extra dopamine is causing an issue with a neurobiological mechanism – the flood of
dopamine, which plays a vital role in learning and reward-seeking behaviour, causes a misfiring,
causing far more weight to be put on the returns (or potential returns) from gambling than they
(normatively) should. It is interesting to note that dopamine is implicated in many behavioural
pathologies, including drug abuse.60 In most of us, the release of dopamine is closely controlled by a
group of neurons (dopaminergic neurons).61 When the control of dopamine is lost through the
supplementation of dopamine in medication, there foms a disconnect between the mechanism which
controls this release and the groups of neurons which use this release to learn. Dopamine plays a crucial
role in learning and motivation, so this disconnect means one of the major controls over behaviour has
been lost. Instead of the dopaminergic neurons playing a role in controlling behaviour, they are (to a
lesser or greater extent) made less significant, meaning a part of the agent which used to have control
over aspects of behaviour no longer does (or, at least, that control is diminished or compromised). This
means there is a disconnect at a very deep level, and the fact that this often leads to a seemingly non-
normative change in behaviour suggests that this loss of control causes a disconnect between the
59 Arias-Carrión & Pöppel, 2007
60  Gaetano, 1995
61 Arias-Carrión & Pöppel, 2007
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agent's true values and their current behaviour. The reason for the behaviour is not from the person's
deep values or personality traits. Instead, it is from a mechanism not doing what it should, causing a
disconnect between these deep values and the behaviour l outcomes.
As noted above, we must be careful not to become mix d up and allow for just anyone to plead
that they are not responsible for some action because some brain mechanism made them do it. We
cannot define the normal working parameters for brain mechanisms to be those such that the cause of
any morally wrong (or right) action falls outside of those parameters, as this would eliminate
responsibility – anyone who did something which was rong or right would by definition would have
acted due to a faulty mechanism, and therefore would not be responsible. We can try to identify some
cases where it would be wrong to assign responsibility, such as when the action derives from a part of
the brain which has a lesion which obviously causes that action or when medication is causing a drastic
change in neurochemistry, which has a documented eff ct on behaviour of certain sorts. These sorts of
faulty mechanisms, which lead to a lack of integration across neural mechanisms, may map on to a
parallel lack of integration at the psychological level. 
There are all sorts of cases which are not so obvious, r where it seems the physiological facts
may somewhat mitigate, but not completely eliminate, responsibility. Many addiction cases may fall in
this range – substance addictions certainly have a physiological component, and may have an effect on
neural mechanisms. There are addictions of varying degrees of severity, and the considerations here
help to elucidate the significance of these addictions for attributions of responsibility.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have attempted to address some of the issues with the Whole Self account by
drawing on the Deep Self account. This gives us some criteria for what sorts of causes of actions we
can hold an agent responsible for, although I have argued that we may not be able to give a rigorous
definition of exactly what these criteria are. I have also made some suggestions about some of the cases
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in which responsibility should not be assigned to an agent – if the action stems from a broken




The previous chapters have attempted to build up a theory of moral responsibility, by combining
and building upon the Deep-Self and Whole-Self accounts. The discussion thus far has offered a
general view of the theory. However, this general leve  view does leaves many important questions
unanswered. This chapter will be an attempt to address some of those questions.
The discussion thus far has left in the background several concepts which should be
investigated explicitly. In order to do this, I will be drawing upon the empirical sciences. By using the
empirical sciences as a basis for expounding upon these concepts, we avoid the possibility of letting
our intuitions run unconstrained. By using empirical work to constrain our theorizing, we make sure
our theories fit the real world.
Throughout the discussion of the previous chapters, I have frequently brought up issues of over-
powering desires – e.g. the compulsions that sufferers of Obsessive Compulsive Disorder and
addictions face. Agents with addictions or pathologies are often exempt from being held responsible for
actions stemming from these afflictions. This raises a host of issues, which thus far have not been
explored – what is will-power, which can be used to combat strong desires? Why, in the cases of OCD
and addictions, can agents be excused from responsibility for acting on strong desires? We all face
desires which are external to our selves in some sense, but we are expected to be able to exercise
enough self-control to keep from acting on such desires. In many of these cases, a failure to control
ourselves seems like something we could be responsible for – saying that we acted with a weak-will
certainly does not always get one off the hook. What differentiates these cases from the excusing cases?
I will argue that we can differentiate compulsions from strong desires in a morally relevant way, and
that understanding more about self-control can helpto sharpen the distinction.
Bound up with issues of compulsions and self-control a e issues of judgement. Generally, we
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say that people are acting weak-willed (synonymously, without self-control) if they are acting in a way
contrary to what they judge to be in their long-term interests. Part of understanding self-control, then, is
understanding judgement and reasoning. Many other qu stions about judgement have been thus far left
untouched, in particular: What is the connection betwe n judgement and responsibility? Our judgement
often leads to actions (or lack of action), and it is for actions that we hold people responsible. This is an
area unexplored in our theory thus far, yet quite rip for discussion. I will argue that there are a host of
reasons why we may, in some cases, blame people for bad judgement, and that the Whole/Deep Self
account can account for this.
The purpose of this chapter is to shed some light on these concepts which have been playing in
the background thus far, and to investigate their connections with responsibility. Doing so will
strengthen the account given so far, and extend it to deal with some interesting questions about
responsibility.
Clarifying Concepts
If anything is capable of having moral responsibility, it seems likely that humans (generally)
are. It seems what makes us likely candidates is the fact that we can understand our environment, make
judgements about our long-term goals, assess reasons for acting, form intentions on the basis of these
assessments, and carry out these intentions. Much of the discussion of moral responsibility has
proceeded as philosophy discussions often do: from anecdotes, thought experiments, and appeals to
intuition. These tools are put to use exploring the concept of moral responsibility, what it means, and in
what situations agents have it. While these tools are, of course, invaluable to the philosopher, often they
are being used in conjunction with numerous concepts which are simply assumed, or only vaguely
defined. With a topic such as moral responsibility, many terms about agents and minds (such as
judgement, rationality, desires, self, etc.) are usd without rigorous discussion – with good reason, as
many of these concepts are vast topics on their own. However, it may be fruitful to take a closer look at
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these concepts, drawing on the empirical sciences for guidance. While we all (presumably) have minds,
and therefore have first-hand experience with them, the cognitive sciences have proven to be extremely
useful in helping us further our understanding of minds. As Paul Thagard notes, “Philosophy operates
best [...] with empirically informed reflection on a wide range of findings in cognitive science.”62 Our
concepts and intuitions are sometimes incorrect, and need constraints and guidance from empirical
findings.
Minds are very complex, and the properties of these complex entities have ramifications for
responsibility. How we perceive the mind as functioning is going to have repercussions on our
conception of responsibility. If it is thought that there is no such thing as practical irrationality – if we
think that people always act in the way they judge as being best, and always judge rationally – our
ideas about attributions of responsibility are goin to be quite different than if we see humans as often
acting irrationally. Often, if we think someone acted due to poor judgement, or due to a strong
temptation, responsibility can be mitigated or – in extreme cases – even removed. Our views on
responsibility hinge in important ways on our views of the mind.
While we may believe we have a grasp on the basics of how a mind works, and that the
empirical sciences are simply the messy details, we are often wrong about how things work. For
example, introspectively it seems that our memories ar  simply records of past events which can fade
or become more difficult to recall. In fact, memories are malleable, and are often filled with incorrect
details even though we feel we vividly recall them, as evinced by how readily false memories can be
constructed or manipulated.63 An investigation which drew on the concept of memory, taking
introspective certainty to always indicate an accurate ecord of past events, would be starting from false
principles. There are plenty of other examples – for instance, our introspections about our reasons for
acting are often wrong.64 Even though it may seem crystal clear to us introspectively why we are acting,
62 Thagard, 2009
63 Paterson et al., 2009
64 Nisbett & Wilson, 1977
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the actual reasons are often hidden from us and our explanations are sometimes just rationalizations.
We must acknowledge that often, our intuitive notions about certain concepts are wrong, and we must
inform our notions with empirical insights.
There are numerous concepts relevant to us which could be analyzed in this fashion. Terms such
as “agent”, “reasons”, “responsibility”, “self”, etc. all could be investigated in great detail to shed light
on the concept of moral responsibility. Here, the discussion will be restricted to two interconnected
concepts which seem most closely related to the invstigation of moral responsibility carried out in the
previous chapters: self-control and judgement. 
Self-Control
It is interesting to note that sometimes we act for good reasons, sometimes we do not. A great
amount of philosophical literature has been written on the subject of weakness of will, and there are a
diversity of opinions on what exactly weakness of will is. Richard Holton, for example, holds that
weakness of will is the unwarranted changing of intentions.65 In this view, once one has judged that a
certain course of action is best, and an intention is formed to act in that way, revising that intentio
without a good reason to do so is an example of weakness of will. The other common view is that
weakness of will is akrasia – acting contrary to one's judgement. In this view, held by Alfred Mele,66
acting weakly is acting in one way while at the same ti e judging that it is not the best course of
action. While this is an interesting debate, we do not have time to go into it here. Instead, we will use a
general definition of weakness of will which satisfie  either: weakness of will is acting in a manner one
has judged (either at the time of action or previously) not to be best, without warrant to overturn that
judgement. 
A distinction must be made here to avoid confusion. Weakness of will is acting contrary to a




to be the one  they have most reason to do, but be incorrect – due to an error in reason, incorrect or
incomplete information, etc. Acting contrary to such judgements can still be a case of weakness of will.
However, it is likely safe to say that in many cases, a failure of self-control leads to actions we do not
have good reasons to do.67  
Self-control is that which allows us to stick by our intentions for future actions and overcome
weakness of will, though precisely how it does thisis omewhat of a mystery. Whatever self-control is,
it is of central importance to many of the cases we have been discussing in previous chapters. When we
withhold blame from someone who has an addiction or Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, we take into
account whether or not we feel that they should be abl to exercise enough self-control to defeat their
urges. Self-control, though, is a rather strange concept – what does it mean to control ourselves? Why
should we sometimes find ourselves out of our control, and what does it mean for us to be exhibiting
self-control? And why should considerations about self-control have any bearing on responsibility? 
The Neuroscience of Self-Control
The ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) is a brain egion which has been found to play a
central role in making decisions. It is thought that this area codes for the value of possible choices.68
Activity in this area correlates with the value subjects place on the options of a decision they are
making. This has been shown to be the case in a number of different decision-making scenarios. This,
combined with data that damage to the vmPFC impairs decision making,69 makes a strong case that the
vmPFC is central to the process of attributing values to different courses of action.
However, an interesting issue arises when one considers self-control. Acting weakly often
seems to be done against our better judgement – thais, we end up taking a course of action even
though we have judged previously that it was not the best way to act. It seems there are two valuations
67 Though possibly not all of the time – for possible examples of self-control leading to an irrational course of action, see
Arpaly, 2000
68 Padoa-Schioppa, 2011; Rushworth et al., 2011
69 Padoa-Schioppa, 2011, pp. 333-332
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which are made – the self-reflective, conscious admission that what the action was not truly the most
highly valued, and the one more directly connected to our motivation which leads to action. When our
self-reflective valuation deems one option higher, but our motivational valuation rates the other as more
valuable, this leads to a self-control conflict – aconflict between what we consciously know is best,
and what we are motivated to do. Does the activity n he vmPFC track our conscious valuation, or the
motivational? It seems to be the latter – the choices of dieting subjects correlates with vmPFC activity,
not with what their long-term values (supposedly) are, nd activity in another brain region, the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) seems necessary for taking these long-term values into
account.70 It is thought that the DLPFC modulates the valuation process taking place in the vmPFC,
making sure it takes into account long-term goals. If this is the case, why does the DLPFC sometimes
fail to modulate the valuation in the vmPFC?
Ego Depletion
Though we do not currently know the complete story of why the DLPFC does not modulate the
valuation process in the vmPFC, and thus why we sometimes fail at self-control, the phenomenon of
ego depletion may give us a hint. Ego depletion is the name given for the phenomenon that certain
tasks are able to deplete some resource that seems r quired for engaging in many types of high-order
planning and reasoning, including self-control behaviour. Ego-depleted subjects thus are impaired
when it comes to performing self-control tasks.71 Ego depletion is caused by, and affects, a large
number of different tasks. It is at the same time int resting and strange. Engaging in some seemingly
unrelated task – such as making a difficult decision – can cause ego-depletion, leading a subject to
spend much less time attempting to solve an insoluble puzzle. Ego-depletion leads to lowered
performance on many self-control tasks, such as squeezing a hand-grip to exhaustion, or eating radishes
70 Hare et al., 2009
71  Hagger et al., 2010, p 495
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and avoiding chocolate.72 It can be caused by asking subjects to suppress thir emotions while watching
an emotional video, or asking them to perform the Stroop task.73 Levy points out how general these
tasks are:
The broad and systematic effects of ego depletion are not preferentially exhibited in the domain
of self-control or the maintenance of resolutions at all; nor are the effects produced by
temptation alone.[..] Ego depletion is produced by Stroop tasks, in which subjects have to name
the colors rather than reading the (conflicting) words; Stroop tasks involve the inhibition of
responses, but not temptation to break a resolution. It is also produced by having to make
choices, which does not involve the inhibition of a response at all. It is even produced by
exaggeration of prepotent responses.74
Since a wide range of different tasks are both caused by, and cause, ego-depletion, it is difficult to
account for these results without making recourse to some sort of shared resource. Subjects who engage
in activities requiring this resource (such as suppressing their emotions during an emotional video) go
on to show less self-control in seemingly unrelated follow-up tasks requiring self-control (such as
squeezing a hand-grip for as long as possible) presumably because the first task saps some of this
resource. 
The reason, then, for why we do not always act in self-controlled ways, may be that the
neurological mechanisms needed to give the proper weight to long-term goals (as well as other forms
of high-level reasoning) are very resource intensive. In particular, it seems that they may require
glucose,75 and it may be that we do not constantly engage in s lf-controlled behaviour because of a
biological strategy to conserve the brain's reserves of glucose.
Intriguingly, it has been observed that those who, for at least several weeks, engage in self-
control exercises – such as monitoring and improving posture, regulating mood, avoiding sweets, or
squeezing a handgrip for as long as possible – then se m to have increased stamina when it comes to
72 Hagger et al., 2010
73 In the Stroop task, subjects are simply asked to read the words that appear before them. However, the words are all the
names of colours, and are printed in a colour other t an the one the word is naming. So, for example, the word “red”
may appear, but be coloured blue. This is a surprisingly difficult thing to do, and reaction times are much lower for this
task than if the colour of the words matches the colour the word names.
74 Levy, 2011, p 147
75 Gailliot & Baumeister, 2007
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other self-control tasks in the lab,76 or even when it comes to a real-world temptation such as
smoking.77 Subjects who have received self-control training are able to engage in a self-control task for
longer than those who do not, and smokers are less lik ly to relapse after receiving training. Exactly
what this training does is not known – it may increas  the amount of glucose the brain stores for these
resource intensive processes, it may make the processes more energy efficient, or perhaps it changes
the resource allocation strategy within the brain, making it more willing to expend the extra resources
to engage in self-controlled behaviour.
This section has aimed to provide some understanding of what sort of thing self-control is, and
why we sometimes fail to engage in it. By elucidating this concept, we're now better able to approach
the issues surrounding the connection between self-control and responsibility.
Self-Control and Responsibility
In many cases, we blame people for their lack of self-control. People who cheat on their lovers,
and then attempt to claim that they “couldn't help it”, do not evoke our sympathy. We blame people if,
through laziness, they do not fulfill their professional or personal obligations. This is generally not
mitigated if they afterwards tell us that they knew fulfilling their obligations was the best thing to d ,
but they could not bring force themselves to do them. Yet, in many other cases, we do not blame people
for failing at self-control. People in the grips of a strong addiction, for example, are generally seen as
needing help and not to blame for continuing their substance abuse (though perhaps they are to blame
for becoming addicted in the first place). How do we separate these cases? In previous chapters, I have
argued that certain forms of pathologies which give r s  to strong desires are not things we can be held
responsible for. This is because giving into them does not properly reflect any aspect of the Deep Self.
One might object to the view on the grounds that, in some cases, we do hold people responsible for
giving in to temptations. If we only blame agents for actions stemming from their Deep Selves, and
76 e.g. Muraven et al. 1999
77 Murvaven, 2010
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many temptations are external to the agent's Deep Slf, how can we blame such an agent for acting on
these temptations? It seems we should not blame any agent for giving in to temptation, yet there are
some cases of giving in to desire we blame people for, and others which we do not. Without a way to
differentiate these cases, we are left either claiming that people are responsible for compulsions in the
same way they are responsible for other strong desires, or that people are not responsible for any strong
desires at all.
How, then, should we attempt to differentiate these cases? Watson gives a useful criterion:
The weak and the strong may be subject to desires of xactly the same strength. What makes the
former weak is that they give in to desires which the possession of the normal degree of self-
control would enable them to resist. In contrast, compulsive desires are such that the normal
capacities of resistance are or would be insufficient to enable the agent to resist. This fact about
compulsive desires is what gives substance to the claim that they are too strong.78
This gives us a way to differentiate the compulsive cases (cases in which we do not want to hold an
agent responsible) from the weak cases (cases in which e do). If the temptation which causes the
agent to act is one that requires more than the normal capacities for self-control, then we should not
hold them responsible. This makes sense – knowing that someone cannot overcome a temptation which
most people would not be able to does not tell us mch about that person's deep-self.
However, this raises the question: What are the normal capacities for self-control? Watson can
do little more than gesture at this. However, with empirical tools on our side, we can be a bit more
descriptive. We have noted that engaging in self-control seems to deplete some resource, and that as
this resource becomes depleted, we become more likely to act weakly. We have also noted that people
can become better at self-control, and there is empirical support for individual differences when it
comes to self-control. These differences may come from the way the resources for self-control are
used: individuals may vary in the amount of the resource stored, or with the efficiency with which they
use it, or with the conservation strategies deployed in using that resource. This gives us an idea of the
mechanism for the variation of strengths of wills. We could run empirical studies to measure what the
78 Watson, 1977, p. 330
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range of people with normal-strength wills would do in various situations to come up with what
constitutes the normal capacities for self-control which Watson makes reference to. It is important to
note that although we do not have the results of such empirical studies to rely on when making
judgements about responsibility, we likely approximate. We likely think about whether we would be
able to resist a temptation in a similar circumstance, or whether our experience tells us that most people
in similar circumstances would be able to. This gives us the ability to judge whether a particular case
was an example of someone acting weakly, or being compelled.
Why do we hold people responsible for their lack of sel -control in the non-compulsive cases?
The Deep/Whole-Self view has a couple of possible answers, each of which may contribute somewhat
to the intuition that sometimes people are to blame for their weak wills. One possibility is just that
failure to engage in self-control may actually come from the agent's apathy. That is, it could be thate
agent judges that taking a particular action does lead to better long-term outcomes, but judges that this
is only slightly preferable to the short-term gains of doing otherwise, and thus is not particularly
motivated to engage in self-control. This may, in fact, reveal deep preferences and values by showing
that these future prospects do not mean much to the agent, thus giving warrant to any blame that may
be placed. Another possibility is that we consider w akness as a deep trait. Since compulsions only
show that a person does not possess greatly above-average strength of will, these do not reveal any
such trait – it only shows that they fall somewhere in the normal range in their will power, something
which presumably most people do. But if one acts weakly (especially if done so consistently), this may
reveal that they are a weak-willed person, the sort of person who is just unable to resist temptations.
Being unable to resist temptations may be a negative trait just as being selfish or having other forms of
ill-will are.
We have addressed the concept of self-control, whatit seems to be, why it has some of the
properties it does, and what its implications for responsibility are. The neurological data on self-control
points to the DLPFC playing a role in mediating thevaluation process in the vmPFC, which allows for
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long-term interests to be taken into consideration. The phenomena of ego-depletion suggests that this
neural mechanism is resource intensive, which is why e do not always engage in self-control. The
distinction between compulsion and weakness helps to differentiate cases in which an agent may be
held responsible for their actions versus when theyma  not. Acting weakly may reveal something deep
about an agent by showing deep biases within the agent, or by showing apathy about the issue at hand.
A lack of strength of will itself may be a deep trait which we hold individuals somewhat responsible
for. Thus, the Whole/Deep Self can account for why e, in some cases, blame people for acting weakly.
Judgement
Judgement plays an important role in both self-control and in issues of responsibility. Weakness
of will is often described as acting contrary to one's best judgement, and self-control is supposed to
stop weakness of will, helping us act in ways consistent with what we judge is best. Ergo, judgement
and self-control are quite closely linked. We hold people responsible for actions – according to the
Whole/Deep-Self view, actions which stem from deep values and desires within the agent. Acting,
however, always (unless it is a reflex or in some other way unintentional) requires a judgement about
how to act, whether it is a quick, unconscious judgement, or the result of a long, conscious deliberation.
As noted above, a region of the brain – the vmPFC – seems to play a large part in assigning
values to different options of choices we face. However, the values it comes to do not always properly
weight our long-term interests – modulation by another brain region, the DLPFC, is necessary, and this
does not always happen. Even if, upon reflection, we realize our choice is not the best, we may end up
choosing the inferior option in any case. This is weakness of will, and it stems from two different
valuation processes – our conscious deliberation abut what is best, and the process in the vmPFC,
which is more closely tied to motivation.
Presumably, though, these two valuation processes are connected. It is unclear how much
conscious thought affects the vmPFC's valuation process as it is going on, but the fact that it can take
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into account long-term goals at all shows that our higher-order planning and goal-setting can have an
affect on how we value different courses of action. Of course, this is not surprising – we know that we
can, at least sometimes, act with strong wills, facing short-term pain for greater long-term rewards. The
last section was about how we do this, and why sometimes we fail to. This section is about judgement
and reasoning – specifically, how we come to consciously judge particular goals as worth pursuing.
Much of the psychology research in reasoning and decision making works within the dual
systems theory framework. The basic idea behind dual systems theory is simple: there are two systems
involved in reasoning: System 1, which is quick, heuristic based, and prone to bias;79 and System 2,
which is slower, more deliberative, can correct System 1, and can involve abstract reasoning and
hypothetical thinking.80 It is assumed that System 1 is evolutionarily old,and that System 2 is newer,
responsible for higher-level reasoning, and is partof what makes us unique as human beings. There is
evidence that strongly suggests that System 2 reasoning requires more physiological resources –
particularly glucose – and that when these resources ar  low, we are less likely to engage in System 2
reasoning.81 In fact, this is the same resource required for self-control, making this an example of ego-
depletion which we discussed above.82 Although this account may over-simplify, positing only two
systems, there are robust findings which the dual systems theory makes sense out of. Even if the story
is more complicated than the dual systems view would have us believe, it seems the story may at least
be approximately correct.
The dual systems account of reasoning is often usedin the decision making literature to account
for many sorts of seeming irrationality. Typically, it is assumed that when subjects in a judgement task
make their choice based on irrelevant details, or fail to use relevant data such as base-rates, the
heuristics-based System 1 reasoning is in use; when these biases are overcome, or reasoning is using
79 Morewedge & Kahneman, 2010
80 Evans, 2003
81 Masicampo & Baumeister, 2008
82 Levy, 2011
55
complex data such as base-rates, it is assumed System 2 is active.83 
Similar to how we do not always engage in self-controlled behaviour, we do not always engage
in System 2 reasoning. Researchers of decision making are interested in what activates System 2
reasoning, and have made some headway discovering what does this. For example, it seems that some
amount of metacognitive difficulty may be what activa es System 2 reasoning, at least in some
circumstances.84 When we run up against something that we are having difficulty processing, we call in
the metaphorical big guns – System 2 reasoning. If no such difficulty is encountered, we go on with our
quick, low-effort, heuristics based approach.
Though this does not explain exactly what judgement is, this discussion does help to clarify the
concept somewhat. Judgement and reasoning are complex cognitive functions. When we engage in
reasoning, sometimes we use one set of cognitive tools based on heuristics which usually guide us well
(System 1), and sometimes we use a different set which, though they take more effort and resources,
allow us to engage in more abstract reasoning which is less subject to bias (System 2). With this
additional understanding of judgement, we are now able to ask an interesting question about
responsibility: To what degree are agents responsible for poor judgement?
Judgement and Blame
Judgement is an important part of moral responsibility for a fairly obvious reason: We use our
judgement to choose our actions, and what we hold people responsible for are those actions that they
choose (in some sense). I want, then, to elaborate n his connection in two ways: first, to be explicit
about the role judgement plays in the Whole/Deep-Self view outlined in previous chapters. Second, I
want to look at casting blame at an agent for their poor judgement.
The first connection is fairly simple. The Whole/Deep-Self view holds that an agent is
responsible for an action if that action stems from a desire or value (or lack thereof) which constitutes a
83 e.g. Alter et al. 2007
84 Alter et al. 2007
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deep part of their self. However, desires and values do not spontaneously generate actions we should
take. When we are faced with a decision, we use our judgement to decide what to do. Our judgement
connects our desires and values with outcomes of various actions, and attempts to come up with the
outcome which best serves our interests. Judgement can be good or bad – that is, it can optimally (or
near-optimally) choose an option which is best suited to satisfy our desires, or fail in some way to come
up with an optimal solution (by improper weighting of desires, poorly approximating the likelihood of
some event, or failing to take some factor into account at all).85 This basis for evaluating judgements is
internalist – it considers whether the judgement is good or not in terms of the agent's internal
perspective, based on the agent's interests. A discussion of an externalist pespective, which consider
broader, moral standards, will occur in the next sec ion.
Given this first connection, the second becomes even more interesting: if bad judgement is
possible, we are responsible for those actions which stem from our values and desires, and bad
judgement implies somehow failing to properly connect our values and desires to the option we choose,
are we responsible for actions we take through bad judgement? There is an appeal to answering this
question in the negative. Since poor judgement seem to just be a mistake on the part of the agent, it is
hard to see why we may want to hold people responsible for their poor judgements. However, I will
argue that the answer to the above question is a qualified “Yes”. The Whole/Deep Self view posits that
we are responsible for those actions which stem fro our Deep Selves. If poor judgement causes a
disconnect between our actions and our deep values, will the Whole/Deep Self view be able to account
for cases in which we attribute blame to agents taking action through poor judgement? The answer to
this question is, again, a qualified “Yes”.
The answer to the first question relies on intuition, but I believe it is a common intuition. When
a politician (or anyone in a position of sort of power) makes a mistake despite having a vested interest
85 Arpaly (2000) argues that there are cases in which our best judgements can fail to track what we actually h ve most
reason to do (from an internalist perspective), even though an unconscious judgement may be tracking the reasons much
more faithfully.
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in doing a good job, it feels right to blame them for this mistake. Imagine a politician who, through
honest but poor economic management, managed to plunge his/her country into a financial disaster.
The politician does want to be re-elected, and cares for the state of the country. However, through a
series of blunders, the politician has brought the country to financial ruin. It feels that at least to some
extent, this politician is blameworthy. Certainly, this blame is different than if the politician acted out of
selfish reasons (if, for example, they had been paid off by a rival country to do this), but it still seems
there is some amount of blame to be placed, despite be ng an “honest mistake”. Even though the
consequences of the politician's decisions did not stem from the politician's deep values, it still seems
that blame is warranted, at least somewhat. Something being an honest mistake may alleviate some of
the blame, but not all of it, and a theory about responsibility should be able to tell us why we are
holding people responsible in these cases. 
To elaborate on the answer to the second question, we must return to the discussion above about
dual systems reasoning. Recall that System 1 is quick, heuristics-based, takes less effort, and is more
prone to biasing, while System 2 is slower, required to engage in higher-level reasoning, and works to
correct System 1. So we are more likely to make mistakes in reasoning when engaging in System 1
reasoning, and engaging in System 2 reasoning is costly. This leads to a fairly intuitive conclusion –
putting extra effort into judging an issue makes one less likely to make mistakes. This leads to one way
in which the Whole/Deep-Self account can explain holding people accountable for poor judgement –
similar to the above argument about self-control and pathy, making mistakes in reasoning may reveal
something deep about the person, because it may show the agent does not care enough about the issue
to put in the extra effort. In this case, the results of the judgement, or the resulting action itself, may not
reveal much about the agent's Deep Self, but if it is clear to outsiders that the reasoning itself seemed to
be poor, this may give pretty strong evidence about the agent's deep values – it may show, even in cases
in which an honest mistake has been made, that the gent does not place a high value on the outcome of
this judgement.
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Sometimes, it may not be that we blame agents just for making errors in judgement, but that we
blame them for the type of errors. Biases often influence our reasoning, especially when engaging in
System 1 reasoning. Some of these cam be morally innocuous (such as hindsight bias, where one sees a
past event as more predictable than it was – and recalling having predicted it to greater accuracy than
one actually did). However, others may show something deep about an agent. A judge who mistakenly
declares a suspect guilty may be suspected of racism if the mistake was large enough, the suspect an
ethnic minority, the judge an ethnic majority, and no other factors seem to explain the judge's mistake.
Not all cases may be as straight-forward as this, but we often implicitly suspect biases of this sort. For
example, we may often implicitly suspect politicians or pundits of unconscious biases (seeing the poor,
rich, foreigners, or members of the opposing party in a particular way) and this may play a role in our
condemnation of those people. In this way, a mistake can reveal a deep rooted value in the form of
biases. This sort of bias has been investigated empirically, for example, in showing that racial biases
can affect legal decisions.86 While we all have biases, and cannot be blamed for being imperfect
humans, a strong bias can certainly reveal something important about a person's deep values.
Deep values may also be revealed in a poor judgement in a more direct way. Even if an agent's
judgement is poor in the sense that, according to their deep values, they should have chosen another
option, this does not mean that their choice does nt tem from deep values. Consider, again, a
politician, making serious policy decisions, who is stuck with one of two options: 1) choose a policy
which is best for the country, but is unpopular with voters, or 2) choose a policy which is popular with
voters, but damaging to the country. The politician does deeply care about the country, but also cares
deeply about being re-elected. If a proper judgement was made, the politician would choose the
unpopular option, as the value placed on the well-being of the country is, subjectively, higher than the
value the politician places on being re-elected. However, at the end of a long day, the politician is
forced to make a choice – and makes a poor choice, ac ording to her/his deep values, and chooses the
86 Levinson, 2006
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option which is worse for the country. This choice was, largely, because of the agent's deep desires –
the politician really does want to be re-elected. Even though, if able to give it more thought, the
politician would make a different choice, the choice made still does reveal some deep values. Thus, the
outcomes of of some bad judgements may explicitly and consciously be caused by deep values.
I have outlined three ways in which a mistake in judgement may reveal something about the
Deep Self. This, however, is unlikely to tell the full story. There may be other ways in which mistakes
in reasoning reveal something about one's deep values nd desires, but more importantly, we may also
simply see one's ability to judge as an important aspect of them, which we can hold them responsible
for. When someone is being blamed for a mistake in judgement they have made, it is not uncommon to
hear them condemned as “stupid”. Calling one stupid can be used as more than just a derogatory term –
it can be a term of condemnation. Perhaps, then, we simply see agents' faculties of judgement as an
integral enough part of who they are to blame them for having a poor one. This may seem unfair, since
some “luck out” and have good judgement, some get the short end of the stick and have poor
judgement. However, this is also the case when it comes to good or ill will – some people may be born
with, or are raised to have, selfish attitudes. Yet w  blame people for selfish attitudes, and to a much,
much greater degree than we blame people for honest mistakes (even without correcting for
unconscious biases or apathy).
It seems that in some cases, we do blame people for their poor judgements. While saying
something is an “honest mistake” may, if truthful, mitigate some of the blame, it does not always
eliminate it. I have suggested a few different ways of accounting for this, in the framework of the
Whole/Deep Self view. The first three ways posit that a poor judgement actually does reveal something
about an agent's deep values, and therefore (on the Whole/Deep Self account) the agent can be held
responsible for them. Poor judgements may show low value being placed on the subject matter being
judged, revealing the agent's deep values (or lack thereof) about the subject matter; it may be caused by
deep, unconscious biases; or may be more explicitly caused by conscious, deep desires which are just
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being weighted incorrectly. Finally, I also suggested hat perhaps we also place some blame on people
who have bad judgement, just for their having poor judgement – we may treat judgement itself as a part
of the Deep Self. 
Judgement and Pathologies
Some people simply have poor judgement. They are just regularly unable to judge things well.
However, an agent may be said to have poor judgement in o e of two ways. Above, the discussion
centered around judges which are bad from an internalist perspective – what constitutes a poor
judgement is what does not lead to the agent's best int rests. Judgement which is poor from an
internalist perspective does not satisfy the agent's desires (short term and long term) in a manner that
would be optimal. Here, I want to consider those with chronically poor judgement in another sense:
being poor judgement from an external, morally normative perspective. If an agent's judgement
regularly does not take into account factors that it (normatively) should, there is a sense that we can say
that the agent's judgement is poor, even if it is serving the agent's best interests.
According to Wolf, for an agent to be responsible, more is needed than reason-responsiveness
and for actions to stem from the deep-self. She argues that many views of responsibility and the self
(she focuses specifically on Frankfurtian True Self views, but her argument applies just as well to the
view defended here) miss a crucial condition: there is a sanity condition on responsibility.87 This means
one's self and values be connected to the world in a certain way. On Wolf's view of moral
responsibility, people who grow up with deprived child oods or in misguided societies have their
actions governed by mistaken conceptions of values, and are therefore not responsible for actions
stemming from their mistaken values.
For Wolf, agents who grow up in an environment which shapes them such that they cannot tell
right from wrong are not to blame. If we imagine a ruthless, sadistic dictator who has given an
education to her son which insures that he will grow up to hold the same values as his mother, Wolf
87 Wolf, 1988
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says the resulting man is not morally responsible for acting on these values later in life – even if he
fully embraces who he is and the values he holds. The reason for this is that such an agent's values are
not rooted in the world. The agent cannot be said to value what he does because he understands what is
good about these values – as Wolf says about racism, “We cannot say that the racist is responsible for
his racism if it results from his understanding of what is good about racism – for there is nothing good
about racism for him to understand.”88 This creates an asymmetry between agents who are raised with
good values and those who are raised with negative ones, since the agent who is brought up with
positive values can recognize and accept what is good about their values, while there is no such option
for the agent brought up with negative values. For W lf, this means that the agent brought up with good
values can be held responsible, while the agent brought up to be a racist or a ruthless dictator cannot.
This argument can be understood in terms of the reasons-responsiveness criteria of Fischer and
Ravizza89 outlined in the first chapter. Recall that, according to Fischer and Ravizza, moderate reasons-
responsiveness is required for moral responsibility. Moderate reasons-responsiveness includes strong
reasons receptivity, which means not only being able to recognize reasons for acting, but your
hierarchical ordering of reasons must be understandably patterned in an objective way. If you would
pay $200 for a ticket to the basketball game, you should still want to go if you find out the ticket is only
$100. Wolf's argument, then, can be understood as saying that the racist (or anyone else brought up
with sufficiently bad values) is not properly reason responsive – if they accept the value of racism, they
should be even more willing to place value on equality, since it is objectively better. If the racist 
confronted with the value of equality, but rejects it in favour of racism, the racist has failed to rank
these in an objectively rational way, is not strongly reason receptive, and hence cannot be held
responsible. 
There are two assumptions in this analysis which need to be made explicit. The first, most
obvious one is a particular view of morality – that morality is, to a large extent, objective. There is
88 Wolf, 2005, page 269
89 Fischer & Favizza, 1998
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room for disagreement with such a view. This is a very large issue on the nature of morality, which can
be put aside here – suffice to say, if one does not hare Wolf's view on this matter, one has sufficient
reason to disagree with her conclusion that agents with a poor moral upbringing cannot be responsible.
I will remain agnostic on this issue, as the view outlined thus far does not hinge in any way on it. The
second assumption made by the above analysis is that there is no sufficient non-moral reason for
preferring an inferior moral value (such as racism). One possibility is that the racist, after being
confronted with the ideals of equality, keeps with his old, racist ideals because of the effort it would
take to adopt new ideals, the social pressure to keep the racist ideals, the feeling of superiority which
one gains from seeing those of a different ethnicity as inferior, etc. The racist may, at some level, all
else being equal, value equality over racism morally, but all else may not be equal, and there may be
other reasons for continuing to hold racist ideals. In that case, the racist may be strongly reason
receptive, and a proper target of blame.
Thus, depending in important ways on one's views of the nature of morality and on the specific
story one tells about why an agent does not accept a be ter moral value (i.e. whether they do not
because they are incapable of recognizing it as better, or whether they do not because the agent has
some non-moral reasons for choosing the inferior moral option), one may or may not agree that those
raised with poor moral values are not to be considered reason receptive. Thus, there is certainly room,
in the Whole/Deep Self account (which posits reasons-responsiveness as a prerequisite for blame), for
one to say certain people raised without proper moral training are not blameworthy. But this conclusion
is not a necessary one.
The above-mentioned racist and the dictator's son are examples of agents who have been shaped
by their environment to have particular, warped values. But there are also cases of pathologies which
leave certain values inaccessible to the agent. Psychopaths are are an interesting case because they are
unable to make a distinction between moral norms and social norms.90 They also have no problem
90 Blair, 1994
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violating either of these norms if it benefits them. They are, in a sense, amoral beings – morality does
not factor into their decisions.
Given certain assumptions, psychopaths can be said to be reasons receptive – they can
understand reasons, and simply do not consider moral or social norms very good reasons for action.
However, just like with the racist, we may question whether psychopaths really do have reasons
receptivity, and in the same way. Given the assumption that, all else being equal, it is objectively better
to not cause harm than to cause it, psychopaths would fail to be reasons-responsive – if they are truly
amoral, they should not care one way or another about harm. Unlike with the racist, there is no non-
moral reason which favours this attitude, as there is no social pressure to be amoral, and psychopaths
don't derive pleasure from breaking moral norms (they just don't mind doing it). So, given an
assumption about the objectivity of some (any) moral valuation, and given that psychopaths do not care
one way or another about morality, they are objectiv ly wrong in their hierarchical ordering of reason,
and therefore not strongly reasons receptive. It may, then, be more appropriate to put psychopaths in
the same class as bears and wolves and other non-moral beings which can cause harm.
Depending on one's views of the nature of morality nd people's motives for holding certain
values, people with poor moral judgement may or maynot be held responsible. If any moral value
holds objective worth, then it seems psychopaths cannot be said to be reasons-responsive, and are not
proper targets for blame. Agents who were raised with distorted values may not be proper targets for
blame if their values are objectively wrong and there is no non-moral reason for them to hold that
value. Thus, there is room for a plurality of views about the blameworthiness of various cases within
the Whole/Deep Self view.
Conclusion
The previous two chapters developed a theory of moral responsibility. However, it rested on
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many concepts which were left undefined and in the background. This chapter has been about bringing
them to the foreground, and drawing connections betwe n them and the issues raised in previous
chapters. By drawing on empirical findings, we are ble to generate a much richer conceptual
framework to work within, and keep our speculations in check. We have drawn on the cognitive
sciences for information about judgement and self-control, and learned that both self-control and
reasoning require some depletable resource. We often hold people responsible for acting weakly, and
this may be because their behaviour shows an unwilli gness to expend the effort to engage in self-
control, or a weak-will itself may be a deep trait we blame people for. We may hold people responsible
for their (from an internalist perspective) poor judgement partially for the same reasons (that judgement
is a deep trait and failing to engage in careful judgement may show an unwillingness to expend the
effort), but also because their poor judgements maybe caused by unconscious biases or other deep
values. People who have poor judgement from an externalist perspective may or may not be held
responsible, depending on one's views of the nature of morality and on the specifics of the case. These
explorations have helped to extend and strengthen the account which was given in earlier chapters. 
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Summary and Closing Thoughts
The issue of moral responsibility is complex, with many interconnected issues. The central
argument here has been that an agent is considered morally responsible only for actions which stem
from their deep selves. Addictions and disorders can cause us to act in ways which are incongruent with
our deep selves. We do not blame people with Obsessive Compulsive Disorder for their compulsions,
because we know in a sense their actions do not stem from themselves – they are caused by an external
factor, this disorder, which happens to be able to dominate the motivational system of these people.
People are not responsible for all actions that their bodies perform.
I have, along the way, endorsed a Strawsonian view of responsibility91 – responsibility is an
attitude we hold towards other social agents. However, to fill out this view, we must discover under
what circumstances this social attitude is justified. The reasons-responsiveness view brings us part of
the way. Agents must have an objectively coherent hierarchical ordering of reasons for acting – if an
agent will act in one way at one cost, lowering that cost while keeping everything else equal should
result in the same action on the part of the agent. There also should be some conceivable set of
circumstances which, without any changes to the agent, would give the agent enough reason to act
otherwise. This forms a solid foundation for understanding what is required for moral responsibility,
but it leaves some very serious questions. There ar some cases in which agents seems to satisfy the
reason-responsive criteria, yet we would not want to hold them responsible for their actions because
some of those actions seem to be caused by something external to them.
In order to deal with this issue, we need an understanding of what sorts of actions stem from the
agent. I introduced the Whole Self and Deep Self viws to deal with this issue. Agents are responsible
for actions which stem from their Deep Selves. Parts of the Deep Self tend to be enduring, desires
within it tend to be general (as opposed to directed towards specific things), they tend to be reflectively
endorsed by the agent, these traits are often central to the agent's self-conception, and are not generally
91 P.F. Strawson, 1962
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in extreme conflict with other deep traits. This definition excludes pathologies and addictions, and the
desires they give rise to are seen as external to the agent's Deep Self.
We often hold people responsible for the actions they take after failing to judge the situation
properly, or failing to control themselves in the face of temptation. Agents who act without exercising
good judgement or self-control may, in some cases, b  doing so for reasons which stem back to the
Deep Self, even if the desires for that action itself are not particularly deep.
Moral responsibility is a large issue, which connects with many other deep philosophical
questions. The view here provides a framework for thinking about this issue, and furthers the
discussion on what moral responsibility is, and when w  may justifiably hold an agent responsible.
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